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Abstract 
Holistic supply chain collaboration has appeared to be difficult to implement in strategic alliances 
due to managers’ lack of understanding the dynamics of trust-building. Too much reliance on 
technology and too little understanding of the nature of collaborative trust have led to a situation 
where strategic alliances often fail to thrive. This lack of awareness can be additionally observed in 
the supply chain literature: the concept of trust is covered without a profound scientific accuracy or 
clarity. In fact, views on trust are conflicting heavily even within the supply chain discipline. “Trust 
may be the most overused and abused word in the alliance lexicon.” (Fawcett et al. 2012). 
    This thesis aims to fix this gap of knowledge; it establishes a holistic model of trust-building and 
studies the phenomenon from the perspective of several different disciplines such as cognitive 
science, sociology, microeconomics and psychology to build a profound background for the topic. 
The aim is to merge the supply chain use of the concept ‘trust’ with the mainstream of its meaning 
in other disciplines such as in cognitive science. 
    The factors resulting in trust are additionally studied with an empirical questionnaire (n=220) for 
Finnish logistics experts. The results suggest that trust building in supply chains is explained by the 
knowledge-based theory of trust rather than the calculus-based theory. Neither asset specific 
investments nor contracting seem to have a high explanatory power for explaining trust in supply 
chain context. However, the time spent in a particular supply chain collaboration, the efficient use 
of tacit knowledge, extensive information sharing, partner’s reputation and the efficiency & 
seamlessness of the collaboration explain the existence of trust in supply chain collaboration. The 
calculus-based view on trust with its emphasis on transaction cost economics (TCE) is, therefore, an 
outdated view on supply chain management. 
    Additionally, trust can be seen as a capital built on the norm of reciprocity and cooperative 
interaction. Trust is more easily lost than formed since the reciprocity norm punishes heavily those 
who exploit their trustors. Trust capital is created in a temporal context and accumulated through 
an iterative process, which takes time and requires the parties to learn about each other, in other 
words, to gather knowledge. A higher amount of trust capital allows people to trade and negotiate 
better terms in the context of commerce and trade. 
These results imply that trust-building in supply chains should be supported by corporate level 
policies, which encourage the creation of interpersonal relationships and collective learning between 
organizations. This requires trust. The findings suggest that the formation and use of highly complex 
tacit knowledge in supply chains allow the companies to form sustainable competitive advantages. 
Forming affinity groups provides an efficient way to make supply chains flourish through the 
accumulation of tacit knowledge and thus to increase the innovation capabilities and competitive 
advantages of the supply chain alliances. 
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1 Introduction 
“Trust is the glue of life. It’s the most essential ingredient in effective 
communication. It’s the foundational principle that holds all 
relationships.” – Stephen R. Covey (1995) 
 
The practice of Supply Chain Management (SCM) has become a more and more pivotal 
discipline in business literature since the mid and late-90’s. Supply chain relationships are 
nowadays a field of extensive study (Sahay 2003) due to companies’ growing focus on 
specialization to their core competencies. This development has led to a situation where 
noncore operations and functions have been sold and outsourced (Gereffi et al. 2005). 
Technological development together with deregulation of trade have made global sourcing a 
reality (Christopher et al. 2006). This progress and increasing competition have led companies 
to realize the importance of building and maintaining long-term (strategic) relationships with 
their partners (Ganesan 1994; Mentzer et al. 2001; Prajogo & Olhager 2012). 
However, according to Christopher and Lee (2001) businesses focus often too much on 
the tangible and traditional parts of Supply Chain Management at the expense of the important 
intangible elements. Barrat (2004) argues that supply chain collaboration seems to be difficult 
to implement due to too much reliance on technology and the lack of understanding what 
human collaboration is fundamentally about. Obsession with technology is often the largest 
barrier to collaboration (Ireland and Bruce 2000). According to Fawcett et al. (2012) 
“Managers understand neither the nature of trust nor the dynamics of trust building.” 
As McGrath and Sparks (2005) argues, the study of inter-organizational relationships 
has tended to exclude social factors for several decades, as the focus has been mostly on the 
economic foundations of transaction costs. They argue that a new, more modern and extended 
view on SCM should be established, which includes social factors such as “trust, 
interdependence, and a long-term perspective.” The actual nature of human collaboration 
should be understood better for supply chains to gain their full potential. 
The key fundamental, which this thesis focuses on is the concept of trust. Studies on 
trust have been neglected or ignored in the supply chain management context due to the 
complexity of this phenomenon (Christopher and Lee 2001; Barrat 2004). Moreover, the 
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companies have failed to implement and understand the collaborative capabilities and nature 
of trust building in supply chain alliances (Fawcett et al. 2012). The lack of trust is the greatest 
single stumbling block why strategic alliances between companies tend to fail (Sherman 1992). 
Without a foundation of trust, collaborative approach to business (as in supply chain 
management) cannot happen (Daugherty et al. 2006; Fawcett et al. 2012). 
Ballou (2006) argues that the elements of collaboration and trust need to be at the core 
of supply chain management discipline in the future: “Logistics curricula transforming to a 
supply chain curricula should be expanded to include the subjects of relationship and trust 
building.” The lack of this creates a research gap in the supply chain literature. Since trust and 
relationship building are such vital parts of supply chain collaboration, they should be covered 
properly in this context. 
In addition to neglecting the importance of the concept of ‘trust’ in supply chain 
literature, there are also several conflicting views on trust even within the supply chain 
literature context. On the one hand, there is the calculus-based view, which relies on the 
traditional transaction-cost economics (e.g. Suh & Kwon 2006; Williamson 2008). On the other 
hand, a great variety of supply chain literature recognizes a more holistic, interdisciplinary and 
multidimensional view on trust as a temporal knowledge-based phenomenon (e.g. McAllister 
1995; McGrath & Sparks 2005; Ballou 2006; Fawcett et al. 2012; Müller 2014). The conflict 
between these views create an interesting research gap: which one of them have more 
explanatory power to describe the essence of trust in supply chain management? 
The key motivation for conducting this study is the fact that supply chain management 
is essentially very much about human psychology and collaboration. Therefore, the lack of 
profound research and the conflicting views in existing literature creates demand for studying 
trust in the context of supply chain management, more closely. A greater comprehension of 
this matter will essentially lead to a better understanding of the dynamics of supply chain 
integration and thus to managerial implications for increasing business performance. 
 
1.1 The research questions and the aim of the study 
The research problem and gap of this thesis are that the important dynamics of trust-building 
is not known well enough in the supply chain context, and the existing views are inadequate 
and even partly conflicting. The objective of this study is to give some normative 
implications and recommendations for improving supply chain efficiency with paying 
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attention to trust-building dynamics. Therefore, the results of this study are not only meant 
to be descriptive but also normative and having managerial implications for companies in 
supply chains. For these reasons, the research questions of this thesis are: 
1) What is trust, and what is its relationship with Supply Chain Management? 
a) This question is relevant as there is a significant amount of definitions, ambiguity, and 
confusion about ‘what is trust’ between different disciplines of scientific literature. 
Sometimes the definitions and uses vary even inside the specific disciplines such as 
Supply Chain Management (McKnight & Chervany 2001; Barrat 2004; Castelfranchi 
& Falcone 2010; Nickel & Vaesen 2012). 
b) “Trust may be the most overused and abused word in the alliance lexicon.” (Fawcett 
et al. 2012). The study of Fawcett et al. was the only profound article that the author 
could find from this specific perspective. There is thus a lot to discover about this topic. 
c) There is clearly need to be careful with using the term ‘trust’ as there are plenty of 
different definitions and confusion in the scientific community about it. This thesis tries 
to create common ground with cognitive sciences, evolutionary biology, and other 
disciplines to get a good grasp of the fundamental meaning of the term. 
d) As there is a clear and sound definition of ‘trust,’ the concept can be applied and studied 
in the supply chain context with a greater scientific accuracy. 
e) As the literature cited in Introduction section suggests, there should be built a new set 
of supply chain frameworks, on the emphasis on collaboration and trust. The role of 
trust in SCM should be studied based on existing literature and then expanded through 
new findings. 
2) Can trust be seen as a capital? 
a) Harisalo & Miettinen (2010) argue that ‘trust capital’ is the “first order” form of capital 
in the world. Also, some theories in sociology and cognitive science see (Ostrom 1988; 
Mui et. al 2002) trust as an asset-like byproduct of reciprocity. Can, therefore, trust be 
interpreted as a capital in a similar way that Putnam views the concept ‘Social capital’? 
3) How is trust accumulated in supply chain collaboration? 
a) If it is confirmed that trust is a form of capital or asset, it should be studied how trust is 
accumulated and what factors encourage trust-building and what factors discourage it. 
b) How can the special traits of supply chain collaboration be taken into account with trust 
frameworks? 
4) Is the nature of trust in supply chain context more calculative or knowledge-based? 
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a) As the introduction section suggests, there are two main viewpoints concerning trust in 
supply chain context; the calculative-based (Suh & Kwon 2006; Williamson 2008) and 
the knowledge-based (McAllister 1995; McGrath & Sparks 2005; Ballou 2006; Müller 
2014) theories. Which one of these is more accurate perspective and explains the 
phenomenon better? 
5) How can trust building be encouraged to increase the performance of supply chains? 
a) As several citations in the introductory section, (followed by the literature review in 
Section 2) suggests, trust-building can enhance supply chain performance and therefore 
it should perhaps be encouraged in organizations. 
b) If so, what are the best means to do so?  What are some of the concrete ways to promote 
trust-building in supply chains? 
c) It is assumed that a good framework on trust-building should be established to 
understand trust dynamics in supply chains. Therefore, we need to answer questions 1, 
2, 3 and 4 to get the best knowledge to respond the fifth question. 
 
Existing literature assesses mainly some aspects of these issues separately and in a narrow 
sense but fails to build a thorough framework. The research gap should be filled as supply chain 
management practice is often dominated by technological aspects at the expense of human 
perspective as described in the introduction.  
The results of this thesis aim to provide an insight into the mechanisms of trust-building. 
This thesis will hopefully contribute to the supply chain literature by aligning the disciplines 
view of trust better with the established ‘trust literature’ of other disciplines instead of applying 
the concept in a tendentious way of its own. The goal is that this framework will be a useful 
theoretical tool in Supply Chain Management (SCM). Better theoretical understanding of trust 
dynamics in supply chains will contribute to better managerial applications: enhancing the trust 
building in supply chains and thus growing the overall performance of the organizations. 
 
1.2 Research design 
The purpose of this thesis is to build an interdisciplinary and holistic framework of trust 
building in supply chain context. The literature review is supporting the theoretical part of this 
thesis. Based on the introduction, literature review, and theoretical reasoning, relevant 
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hypotheses are formed that will be tested through an empirical questionnaire to study whether 
the theoretical assumptions receive empirical support or not (Figure 1). 
This study begins with the definition of its central concept, ‘trust.’ Secondly, the nature 
of trust is studied interdisciplinary based on existing scientific literature in the context of 
several different disciplines such as sociology, cognitive science, microeconomics and 
evolutionary biology. Thirdly, a thorough literature review of the concept of trust in supply 
chain context is conducted. 
  A literature review is then followed by a theoretical framework of trust building and 
how it enhances the integration of supply chains. The purpose of the framework is to be a sound 
and holistic description of trust building in supply chains based on the literature review and 
logical reasoning. The framework will follow the fact that trust is a complex phenomenon that 
cannot be categorized into only one single scientific domain. 
Based on this theoretical model, introduction and the literature review conducted in 
section 2, relevant hypotheses are formed and finally tested empirically with a survey for 
Finnish logistics experts (section 4). Based on this data, a statistical analysis is conducted to 
test whether the hypotheses are supported or not. At last, conclusions of the results of this study 
are summarized. Finally, the thesis will discuss the aspects of trust building in supply chains, 
which should be explored further. 
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Introduction and 
research gap
Literature review
Reasoning
Theoretical 
framework
Hypotheses
Empirical test of 
hypotheses
Conclusions & 
further discussion
Figure 1: The structure of this thesis. 
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1.3 Research methodology 
The methods used in this research consists of game theory, statistical analysis of variables, 
linear regression, path regression analysis, survey statistics and some simple microeconomics. 
The empirical part of this study applies only quantitative methodologies. 
The theoretical framework (Framework A, Section 3) consist of applied game-
theoretical experiments (inspired by Harisalo & Miettinen 2010). A scenario of repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma (similar to Mor & Rosenschein 1995) in temporal context is used to assess 
the effect of time preference on trusting behavior (similar to Ellison 1994). The utility stream 
of the players is calculated based on the individual’s time preference and strategies used in 
collaboration situations where trust is required. This setting is studied to describe the trust 
building mechanisms, affecting factors and incentives to trust. 
The method used in the empirical part (section 4) is a questionnaire, where the collected 
data will be statistically analyzed. The respondent data in the questionnaire (both A & B 
sections) is collected from two databases: one from Asiakastieto Plc and The Finnish logistics 
expert’s association (Logy ry.).  
The section A of the questionnaire adapts Likert scale survey statistics (Allen and 
Seaman 2007) to 9 different supply chain related propositions. The hypotheses are supported 
or rejected based on whether they are agreed more than disagreed by the respondents with the 
confidence level of over 95%. The margin of error for surveys are calculated through the 
following formula for a confidence level of 95% (VirtuaaliAMK-verkosto): 
±1.96 ∗ √
𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝑝)
𝑛
 
The variable ‘p’ refers to the observed amount of answers i.e. ‘sample probability’ and ‘n’ 
to the amount of total responses given (n=220). Therefore, we can estimate with a 95% 
confidence level the right percentage of the population that agrees with the propositions. 
Additionally, we can estimate whether the majority of the population supports the proposition, 
and are the hypotheses supported or not. 
Section B focused on representing 16 propositions of a specific supply chain 
companionship with a certain firm which the respondent is asked to recall to his mind. In this 
way, it is meaningful to study which aspects of supply chain collaboration explain the existence 
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or emergence of trust the most. It answers thus to the research question 3 by explaining which 
factors accumulate trust the most.  
The answers of section B were also collected with a 7-option Likert-scale, with the 
exception of question one, which is about the level of trust in a supply chain. In this question, 
a 9-option scale was used as it is able to capture more detailed nuances of the answer compared 
to 7-option scale (Suh & Kwon 2006), as the priority of this thesis is to study especially trust. 
Suh and Kwon (2006) uses a similar model. The data is analyzed by a multivariate regression 
analysis (OLS) with Stata software to get parameter coefficients, -values, r-squared values, and 
so forth. 
A path regression analysis is used to explain the dynamics of trust-building more 
closely (Suh & Kwon 2005). The statistical analysis will hopefully reveal which aspects of 
collaboration have the strongest and most statistically significant effect on trust and trust 
building in supply chains. The results give us a hint what factors should be taken into account 
to increase the level of trust in supply chains. It also helps to answer the research question 4, 
to see whether calculative-based factors explain more trust than knowledge-based factors or 
the other way around. The quantitative model is built on Likert-scale respondent data, which 
is then used to explain the emergence of trust similarly to Suh & Kwon’s studies (2005 & 
2006). 
 
1.4 Initial Hypotheses 
To support the initial claims mentioned in this introduction section by empiric evidence, the 
initial hypotheses of this study are the following: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): “Trust and the seamlessness of human collaboration are more important 
factors for the success in supply chains than the use of technology.” 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): “The role of technology as a superior factor of supply chains is often 
exaggerated.” 
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2 Literature review 
As the concept of trust is highly complex and rich (Jarrat & Ceric 2015), it is meaningful to 
conduct a thorough literature review to define the it and the phenomena related to it. As it is 
made clear enough what all these concepts are and how they are interrelated, building a 
theoretical framework upon them is more meaningful. This is also relevant since studies show 
that managers in companies understand neither the trust-building process nor the nature of trust 
(Fawcett et al. 2012). 
 This section starts with defining the concept of trust and reviewing a meta-analysis 
conducted by Castaldo (2002) of related literature. Then it builds the understanding of the 
dynamics of the concept and how it is related to supply chain management and finally relevant 
hypotheses are formed based on the literature review and logical reasoning. 
As the phenomenon is wide-ranging and broad, it is meaningful to get a grasp of it 
through different disciplines such as microeconomics, sociology, and other social sciences as 
well as evolutionary biology. As trust is understood poorly in supply chain context (Fawcett et 
al. 2012), I will provide a thorough backgrounding to the phenomenon in general with the 
literature review, and later add up how all of this is related to supply chains and supply chain 
management. The following literature review section thus deals with the first research question: 
“What is trust, and what is its relationship with Supply Chain Management?” 
The concept of ‘trust’ is used in various ways in different contexts. This often creates 
confusion and misunderstandings in the scientific literature (McKnight & Chervany 2001; 
Castelfranchi & Falcone 2010; Nickel & Vaesen 2012). This is why the trust related discussion 
should be backed with an interdisciplinary foundation. After this, trust in supply chain context 
is covered in section 2.3. 
 
2.1 The concept of ‘trust’ 
When we look at the history of scientific literature and published articles, we see there is a 
great variety of different definitions for the concept of trust. Trust is a social construct that is 
the glue of human interaction and society (Covey 1995; Harisalo & Miettinen 2010). This 
section, 2.1, studies the phenomenon broadly from sociological, evolutionary biological and 
cognitive science perspectives. 
 Literature review 
 
 10  
 
According to Castaldo (2002, as cited in Castelfranchi & Falcone 2010), the amount of 
definitions for trust has increased exponentially during recent decades. More than this, there is 
a significant amount of confusion and ambiguity surrounding the concept of trust 
(Castelfranchi & Falcone 2010). A common problem with these trust definitions is that trust is 
often rather defined based on the needs of the context where it is used, than paying attention to 
the scientific accuracy of the concept. As an example, trust means different thing to an 
economist compared to the perception of a sociologist, marketer, philosopher or an information 
scientist (McKnight & Chervany 2001). In fact, the definition of trust varies even within these 
fields (Nickel & Vaesen 2012).  
 According to a thorough meta-analysis of trust definitions, conducted by Castaldo 
(2002), there are five categories, which constantly occur in the definitions of trust: construct, 
trustee, actions & behaviors, results & outputs and the risk element. Based on this thorough 
meta-analysis, these five seem to be the central elements of trust. 
The construct or conceptual type refers to the element that what is trust essentially 
conceived to be. Common ways to define trust concerning of conceptual types is to consider 
trust as an expectation, disposition, belief or an attitude (McKnight & Chervany 2001) of a 
cognitive agent. 
 The trustee category refers to the individual, firm, organization or a family which the 
trust link is or is not established. Depending on the nature of the counterpart of a trust associated 
act, there are different types of trust: personal, inter-organizational and institutional. The trustee 
is usually evaluated based on certain attributes and traits such as values, competencies, 
reputation and tendency for opportunism and so on. The question “which characteristic is most 
important” depends on context (McKnight et al. 2001). The trustee does not have to be 
necessarily a cognitive agent: the trustee may also be an object (trust in the safety of a car) or 
an institution (trust in the monetary system). 
 Actions and behaviors underline the nature of trust in the way that trust must be 
manifested through the actions and behaviors of human beings. Without the act of trusting, the 
‘intentions’ or ‘attitudes’ of trusting are empty words. The actual behavior fulfills the positive 
intentions (attitude) of trusting (Ståhle & Blomqvist 2000). Both parties (trustor and trustee) 
and their actions should be taken into account when relationship relying on trust is studied 
further. 
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Results and outputs refer to the notion that a trust relationship is formed on the 
assumption that the results of cooperation are positive and relatively predictable for both parties 
engaged. People develop dispositions to trust other people in general when they grow up 
(Erikson 1968). Conscious actors collaborate in trust relying ways in order to achieve goals 
which benefit them.  
 Acts of trust involve (by definition) always some form of risk, which has to be accepted 
(Mayer & Davis 1995).  Without free will and autonomy of trustor and trustee, the study of 
risk would be pointless as everything would be deterministic. Thus the concept of trust would 
not be needed even to define. A central aspect of trusting behavior is trustor’s vulnerability to 
the trustee: the trustor makes himself vulnerable for trusting and is exposed for example to the 
risk of deception or opportunistic behavior. Trustor gives the trustee power over himself as the 
dependency is formed (McKnight & Chervany 2001). Thus the attitude, and more importantly 
the behavior, of trusting is always about managing risk. Therefore, the trustor must gather 
information about agents whether or not they can be trusted. 
 
2.1.1 The basics of trust 
Cognitive scientists Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010) represents two different meanings for 
trust, which are interconnected as they demonstrate. These are trust as a) a psychological 
attitude and b) as a decision to act relying on, counting on or depending on the trustee (See 
Figure 2). (Blomqvist (2002) presents a similar concept model.) They argue that a profound 
definition and theoretical framework has to include both components. The dyadic relationship 
of these two meanings jointly forms the concept of trust.  
 Trust as an act relying on the trustee (b) includes implicitly the notion that the cognitive 
agent X has conducted an analysis of the trustee in the specific context, i.e. has formed an 
attitude of trusting the trustee Y (a). On the other hand, the attitude of trusting (a) is the 
presupposition to the act of trusting (b).  
The process which leads to trusting acts includes a positive evaluation of the trustee. 
Trusting action with positive outcomes, in turn, improves the mental attitude to trust 
(Castelfranchi & Falcone 2010). The causal relationship between (a) and (b) is, therefore, a 
two-way relationship. In temporal context, they form a loop of trusting behavior (Figure 2). 
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2.1.2 Theoretical definition of trust 
As we continue to explore trust from the cognitive science perspective, we will expand the 
model further with an accurate definition of trust. Castelfranchi and Falcone represent in their 
book Trust Theory (2010) a profound theoretical definition or a model of trust which includes 
all the fundamentals of trust mentioned by Castaldo (See section 2.1). They view trust as a 
relational construct in social reality between two agents: the trustor X and the trustee Y. 
For the model to be meaningful, the trustor X must be an intentional cognitive agent as 
the act and attitude of trusting is a social construct existing only in the social reality. Otherwise, 
the definition of trust as a mental attitude would not be met since only a cognitive agent can 
have mental perceptions. The trustor has to have goals and vision of causal acts in order to 
reach his goals (von Mises 1949). The trustee Y is an agent, but in a broader sense than X. Y 
could be for example an institution or a group of people, even a chair (Blomqvist & Ståhle 
2004). The role of trustee Y is in this model the (supposed) ability to cause an outcome, which 
serves the goals of agent X. 
The act α is the procedure which Y performs to get the outcome, p. The couple of α and 
p can be combined as Y’s task: τ. As the outcome p is desirable in the point of view X for 
Trustor 
X
Trustee 
Y
The 
psychological 
attitude towards 
trusting Y 
Relationship 
between 
(a) and (b) 
Figure 2: The relationship between the two natures of trust (Castelfranchi & Falcone 2010). 
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helping him to reach his goal Goalx(g)=gx; the act of trusting serves X for increasing his or her 
utility (wellbeing).  
The act of trusting always happens in a context, say C. This variable omits the 
situational factors such as environment, the context of the act of trusting and other case-specific 
factors other than the ones mentioned in this section. For example, a well-appreciated cook can 
have a high reputation and is thus trusted, among his colleagues in a fancy restaurant. However, 
the same person might have a bad reputation in the context of family life, for example, 
considered untrustworthy among the family relatives.  The context affects the possibility of Y 
to success in performing τ. 
Taken these elements, Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010) represents their model as follows: 
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇 (𝑋 𝑌 𝐶 𝜏 𝑔𝑥) 
“X trusts Y in context C for performing action α to realize result p, which helps X to 
reach his goal gx.” The components and their relations should be studied further. 
First of all, X trusting Y means the trustor must believe that Y is willing to conduct α. 
X will also evaluate if Y is able to perform the act of α. For Y to be reliable from the perspective 
of X; he or she must make an evaluation of Y. Is Y able and willing to perform α? X needs to 
analyze whether Y has the needed traits and properties for conducting α.  
This evaluation can be performed by X, both by using his personal experience as well 
as based Y’s reputation on historically performed acts. The concept of reputation and 
competence deals with these issues. X must also consider the fact whether Y is dangerous for 
X in this context as the trustor is by definition vulnerable to the trustee. Predictability is the 
virtue; which X requires from Y for feeling safe.  
Trusting behavior always includes the element of risk. In fact, the concept of trust 
emerges from the fact that the world is uncontrollable and there is always uncertainty and 
riskiness (Luhmann 1979). The agent Y could deceit, disappoint or betray X. Since trust makes 
X vulnerable to Y who has free will or autonomy, he or she can always act opportunistically 
towards X to benefit himself. X should also consider the side-effects of the outcome p as there 
might be side outcomes besides the goal gx, which is the original motivation of trusting 
behavior. P could have negative externalities to X himself, other agents around or the society 
in general. 
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2.1.3 Different types of trust 
Given that the phenomenon of trust between two actors, X and Y, has been defined rather 
accurately with the language of cognitive science in previous sections, we need now to develop 
the theme further in help with other disciplines. In this and the following sections, 2.1.4 and 
2.1.5, the different types, uses, mechanisms and properties of trust are studied more carefully 
based on the scientific literature (psychology, evolutionary biology & sociology), so that we 
have finally genuine amount of background research completed to bring the concept of trust to 
the supply chain management context in section 2.3. 
According to Paul and McDaniel (2004), trust can be divided broadly into four specific 
categories. These are calculative trust, trust in integrity, competence trust and trust in 
predictability. These four and additionally the concepts of knowledge-based and identification-
based trust (Lewicki & Bunker 1995) reflects the phenomenon of trust more or less as we 
observe it in our everyday life. 
Competence refers to trusting the trustee’s ability to perform the required task τ, which 
the trustor X needs in order to achieve his goals. Trust has therefore in addition to its moral (or 
goodwill) element a clear dimension associated with the abilities and competencies of the 
trustee. This perspective is often neglected in trust literature (Castelfranchi & Falcone 2010). 
Trust can, therefore, refer to the agent Y’s competence to get desirable outcomes for the 
trustors. Competence in this context refers to skills, know-how and technical capabilities of the 
parties (Blomqvist & Ståhle 2000).  
 Calculative trust refers to the economic calculation of the (boundedly) rational actor 
who constantly seeks to maximize his or her well-being by assessing costs and benefits. This 
type of trust is typical in relationships where interpersonal relationships are not formed, but 
rather the interaction of human beings are about making business for a short while (Paul and 
McDaniel 2004). 
 Predictability refers to the belief of the trustor that the “expected value of the 
cooperation” is positive. The process of calculation is associated with this type of trust but is 
far more institutional by nature. “Predictability-trust” is based on stability, consistency and 
predictable patterns of past of behavior from the point of view of the trustor. 
Integrity refers to the assumption that the other party is fair and is relying on the 
common rules of the society and the established institutions. Honesty and benevolence are 
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related to this category. This type of trust is flourished from experience and interpersonal 
partnerships (Ghosh & Fedorowicz 2008). 
 
2.1.4 From calculative trust to knowledge-, and identification-based trust 
To develop the theme a bit further, an interesting perspective in the scientific literature, the 
concept of knowledge-based or cognitive trust, shall be reviewed. This idea refers to the 
theoretical foundations that trust building is based on acquiring knowledge in temporal context 
and about understanding the other individual collaborated with (Jarrat & Ceric 2012). Creating 
knowledge in repeated interactions is the basis of knowledge-based trust. As calculus-based 
knowledge is founded on the trustor’s ability to control, the knowledge-based view’s 
foundation is information (Lewicki and Bunker 1995). (This section lays some theoretical 
background for the research question 4.) 
In personal relationships, knowledge-based trust emerges from the foundations of 
calculus-based trust after the interactions are repeated by time. The parties form “knowledge 
of the other’s dependability and reliability” (McAllister 2006 et. al). The information formed 
by time serves as the basis of predictability, which in turn increases trust (or distrust), further 
(Beheshtifar and Naghian 2013). 
Knowledge-based trust is more forgiving and “robust” – it enables forgiveness in 
certain situations if the explanation for violation is understandable (Kopp et al. 2003). 
Therefore, knowledge-based trust is based more on understanding and empathy than calculus-
based trust, which assesses cost and benefits and relies on control. 
When knowledge-based trust develops to a certain point, it might transform and give 
foundation to identification-based trust (Lewicki and Bunker 1995). This transformation 
happens when people understand each other’s well enough, and the relationship is 
interpersonal. This type of trust requires to “fully internalize and harmonize with each other’s 
desires and intentions” (Diamond Management Consulting). 
The key is to adapt and share the same preferences with the other, i.e. identify and 
commit to other’s mindset of needs, fears, and behaviors, and think about other’s goals partially 
as one’s own goals. Lewicki and Bunker argue that calculative-based trust will emerge in some 
relationships, knowledge-based trust in many and identification-based trust only in a few 
(McAllister 2006). This process is seen to develop through time. 
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The notion that theory of knowledge-based trust is based on trust accumulating by time 
suggests that trust building is a process where it is formed in temporal context through 
collaboration. This aspect should be analyzed further. 
There is some debate in the scientific (supply chain) literature (Suh & Kwon 2005 & 
2006) whether knowledge-based theory explains better the phenomenon of trust building in 
supply chains than the calculus-based theory or not. As this paper is about trust building in 
supply chains, this question should be answered. This dilemma will be analyzed more in section 
2.5. 
 
2.1.5 Trust as a process 
The previous section suggests that forming trust is a process. This section reviews how the 
reality looks like. Is trust a process? If so, how trust is accumulated and formed by time and 
what are the mechanics of trust-building? (See Research question 3.) 
 According to Castelfranchi & Falcone (2010), forming trust is more than only 
forecasting probabilities for trusting behavior in a calculative manner. More accurately, 
forming trust between agent’s X and Y is a process (Illes & Platts 2006; Khodyakov 2007). It 
Calculus-based 
trust
Knowledge-
based trust
Identification-
based trust
Figure 3: Development of trust according to Lewicki and Bunker (1995). 
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requires mutuality and reciprocity. Trust is evolving in a temporal context by repeated 
interactions which (supposedly) satisfies the both parties.  
Trust can be seen to accumulate in an evolving process where the past and current 
experiences are combined by the trustor to make predictions about the future behavior of the 
trustee (Blomqvist 2002). Reputation and shared values between individuals enhance the 
building of trust (Gulati 1995) as the act of trusting becomes more predictable for the trustor. 
Trust is a two-way interrelationship and learning to trust is usually slow (Harisalo & Miettinen 
2010). 
 Trust creation process can be best described as a situation where parties involved share 
ideas, knowledge, feelings and sentiments, which leads to the building of shared social 
understanding. The creation of connections based on reciprocity, sympathy, and common 
interest can be seen as prerequisite of a fruitful collaboration (Harisalo & Miettinen 2010). 
Trust builds up gradually and slowly, but can be lost in once if one of the parties feel that the 
other one acts opportunistically (Harisalo & Miettinen 2010). The implications of this are that 
trust is fragile and requires (social) institutions and high level of morality to be preserved.  
Noteboom (2002) sees trust as a three-phase process. The first stage is control, as trust 
does not exist between the parties: the agent X must take into account the possible scenarios 
that the trustee Y is opportunistic or not competent enough to perform the task. Control replaces 
trust. The second stage is about taking steps towards trust. The trustworthiness of the trustee is 
assessed through his actions. The trustor discovers on what conditions the collaboration is 
working and has always the possibility to reverse the relationship back to the control stage. The 
third stage is about building common frames for trusting between parties. This stage requires 
the development of shared meanings, concepts, and experience from past. This model of 
Noteboom is similar to Lewicki and Bunker’s model (1995) of calculus-based knowledge 
developing first to knowledge-based trust and finally into identification based-trust. 
 According to Granovetter (1992) “human beings do not start fresh every day, but carry 
the baggage of previous interactions into each new one.” This implies that being reliable in 
everyday relationships increases one’s reputation and trustworthiness in future. People start the 
next day where the last day ended regarding accumulated trust and reputation. This indicates 
that one’s history of being trustworthy (or not) influences the opportunities of the individual in 
the present and future. 
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 The model of Mui, Mohtashemi, and Halberstadt (2002) (Figure 4) implies that trust 
process is based on the concept of reciprocity. They argue that rather than being rational 
economic agents - game theoretical utility-maximizers, human beings form heuristics of 
decision making, often based on reciprocity. Bounded rationality makes it wise to employ 
“routines” such as heuristics so that the limited capacity of the human mind is saved for more 
unfamiliar situations (Herbert Simon 1983). Reciprocity norm emerges in human collaboration 
when agents confront repeated interactions. According to Ostrom (1998), reciprocity norm is 
an umbrella term for all social strategies where cognitive agent responds positive actions by 
positive responses and vice versa with negative actions. 
 
According to Mui et al. (2002) the norm of reciprocity, the institution of reputation and 
the concept of trust creates a triadic relationship with causal links, which leads to benefits for 
the parties involved (See figure 4). In a social environment where individuals act together 
constantly, an incentive to act reciprocally emerges because having a good reputation increases 
the agent’s fitness in the environment, where reciprocity norm is expected, in terms of 
evolutionary biology (Nowak and Sigmund 1998). 
Trust is built on consistent and predictable acts over a longer period (So & Sculli 2002). 
An agent with better reputation is considered to be more trustworthy i.e. is trusted more. If the 
agent “fulfills” his or her reputation and continues to act reciprocally, this again increases the 
agent’s reputation, and so the loop continues as reputation is built step-by-step. Trust creates 
trust (Casterfranchi & Falcone 2001). 
trust
reciprocityreputation
Net benefit 
Figure 4: Relationship between trust, reputation and reciprocity (Mui et al. 2002). 
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Trust is built incrementally and gradually. It is strengthened through trusting behavior 
in the past and with the help of previous positive experiences of trusting (Zand 1972; 
McAllister 1995). Therefore, the trait of having good reputation and being trustworthy can be 
considered as an asset in social environments. 
Blomqvist and Ståhle (2000) defines trust as “actor's expectation of the other party's 
competence, goodwill and behavior.” Their model contains “three layers of trust.” They 
believe that all these traits are needed for trust to develop (see Figure 5).  
 
 
 
Competence is required for people to be able to cooperate in a professional business 
context. People acting together must have capabilities, skills, and know-how to perform the 
given tasks. Goodwill refers to the moral aspect of trusting, i.e. wishing positive outcomes for 
the other party. The benevolence of the trustee is of particular importance because the trustor 
has to accept vulnerability. 
Finally, trust must be fulfilled through behavior. Actual acts of trust and kept promises 
confirm whether the trust is misplaced or reciprocal. Trust building should not be “all talk, no 
action.” Trust develops in a process when these three layers of trustworthiness are 
accumulated. The trustworthiness is reached iteratively when trustor and trustee interacts 
together (Figure 6). The process will reveal the trustworthiness of the trustee, which in turn 
will influence the trustor’s propensity to trust him. This creates a circular motion; similar to 
Castelfranchi & Falcone’s as well as Mui et al.’s models (Blomqvist 2002).  
Figure 5: Development of trust through layers of trustworthiness (Blomqvist & Ståhle 2000). 
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2.2 Trust as a capital 
“Broadly defined, institutions are the prescriptions that humans use to 
organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions including those 
within families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, 
private associations, and governments at all scales.”  – Elinor Ostrom 
(2005) 
This section of the thesis studies ‘trust’ through a sociological perspective and takes a broader 
view of trust-building in the context of social institutions, society, and gives answers whether 
trust and social institutions are fundamentally based on rationalistic or evolutionary approach 
(Hayek 1988). As trust can be viewed as an asset in social environments, it might be interpreted 
as a form of capital. This section studies the benefits of creating and using trust and social 
capital. This section, 2.2, is linked to the research questions 3, reviewing whether trust can be 
seen as a form of capital or not. 
 Harisalo and Miettinen (2010), argues that trust is the “first order rule of every 
society”. Therefore, trust is “the capital of capitals”, profoundly creating the meaning for other 
types of capital, such as the traditional financial capital. Apart from other forms of capital, trust 
cannot be bought as it can be only earned through right behavior. This indicates that the nature 
Trustor’s propensity 
to trust 
Trustee’s perceived 
trustworthiness 
 
Increased perception 
of trustworthiness 
 
Increased propensity 
to trust 
Actor’s interaction 
Figure 6: Interaction Dynamics of Trustor and Trustee (Blomqvist 2002). 
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of trust is profoundly based on the virtues of acting moral, cognitive agents. Trust capital 
motivates people to learn and try new things as it is natural to share and create new ideas in an 
atmosphere of trust (Harisalo & Miettinen 2010). 
 According to Luhmann (1979 as cited in Harisalo & Miettinen 2010), trust capital helps 
people to deal with complexity and uncertainty in social contexts. Therefore, these contexts 
create a demand for trust capital. Trust capital decreases transaction costs as in the atmosphere 
of confidence people can take new initiatives and start new projects without the fear of being 
deceived or questioned by default (Harisalo & Miettinen 2010). Trust helps to focus on the 
essential value creation rather than the aspect of protecting oneself from frauds and being 
vulnerable. 
Trust capital and reputation increase the chance of agent X to establish links to other 
agents as well as other agents to select the actor with high trust capital as their collaborator. 
“Social capital improves the price that trustee can obtain in markets,” as the trust capital 
increases his or her market value as a collaborator. This capital helps agent X to earn 
reputational premium prices in the markets due to the higher amount of trust capital in the eyes 
of trustors. Trust is an asset. A great amount of trust and social capital explains why “friends 
and family trade more and on different terms than do the estranged and strangers” (McGrath 
& Sparks 2005). The context of family explains well the benefits of a high amount of social 
capital – transactions are more fluent and secure. 
Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010) makes an important remark analyzing trust capital: 
there are individual and collective forms of trust capital, which should be clearly disentangled. 
These types of capital are even contradicting each other: individuals benefit if they can stand 
out in a crowd and thus enjoy a higher concentration of trust capital than the other individuals 
around them. 
Trust capital is highly related to Robert Putnam’s theory of social capital (Harisalo & 
Miettinen 2010), which for example Coleman (1988) interprets to be consisting of trust, norms 
of mutuality and networks. According to Hayek (1988) social institution and social capital is 
accumulated by a spontaneous process, where institutions emerge based on their ability to serve 
the population which follows the institution. This evolutionary process goes mostly beyond 
human understanding and is about following the practices, which benefit the population in 
long-term, not about what “makes sense” and is rational. The process of accumulated social 
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capital is not “deductive” or “rational” by its nature but practical and acquired by experience 
and cultural evolution of generations (Laakso 2014). 
Based on this chapter of the literature review, the hypothesis formed is the following: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): “Trust can be seen as capital, i.e. ‘trust capital’.” 
 
2.2.1 Trust and rationalism 
The debate whether calculation and rationalism are the basis of trust should be reviewed as it 
deals with the issue that whether trust is explained by the calculus-based or the knowledge-
based theory (Research problem 4). Therefore, it is crucial to study the core nature of rationality 
as the basis of trust and show the problems related to it. 
According to the American economist, Robert Sugden (1989), social institutions are 
formed unconsciously and spontaneously from human interaction. The historical institutions 
are not formed based on some collective rational designing or calculation, but rather from 
cumulative cultural evolution. Any amount of rationality cannot replace the role of the 
spontaneous cultural evolution of institutions. Sugden defends the concept of spontaneous 
order as the foundation of cultural innovations and criticizes the rational game-theoretical 
explanations of these institutions (Laakso 2014). 
 According to Harisalo and Miettinen (2010), the claim that rationality is the prerequisite 
for trust is highly controversial. They argue that the complexities of everyday life interaction 
often lead to situations where the rational behavior endangers trust. Examples of this include 
the adverse selection phenomenon in economics. 
Agents often have incentives to cheat each other. The rational behavior can as well 
encourage to spread rumors about other colleagues in an organization to increase one’s relative 
status in the organization. The point is that rationality and trust may conflict and thus it is highly 
questionable to regard rationality as the basis of trust (Harisalo & Miettinen 2010). 
 The Nobel-prize winner economist F. A. Hayek criticizes in his book The Fatal Conceit 
(1988) the concept he refers to as “constructive rationality.” This concept implies that rational 
deduction and reasoning can explain essentially anything. He refers to this kind of rationalism 
as “Cartesian rationalism,” named after the rationalist philosopher Rene Descartes. According 
to Hayek (1988), social institutions are for the most part beyond rational thought and based on 
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evolutionary rationalism, which is based on practical knowledge and social institutions which 
are complex. 
The relevance of this, on studying the concept of trust, is that trust cannot be reached 
or acquired by rational thought or calculation as it is epistemologically impossible. The social 
reality is too complex for a totally rationalistic calculation. There are always some asymmetries 
in information and the other agent, trustee, is beyond control to some degree, as people are 
usually autonomous to act according to their free will. Instead of calculation, people use 
heuristics (Mui et al. 2002) and intuition to evaluate the trustworthiness of the trustee.  
The game theory explains as well why rational behavior can lead to non-pareto optimal 
outcomes (Haugen 2004; Harisalo & Miettinen 2010). One application of this is a game-
theoretical setting called “the prisoner’s dilemma”. Two criminals, ‘a’ and ‘b’, are suspected 
of a crime (Harisalo & Miettinen 2010). If they co-operate, each of them manages to get only 
a three-year sentence. If one deceives the another; he or she will get free and the other one will 
get a 10-year sentence. If they both choose to deceives, they both get a 9-year sentence (Table 
1). 
 
Table 1: An application of the Prisoner's dilemma. Nash equilibrium bolded. 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
Co-operate (b) 
 
Deceive (b) 
 
Co-operate (a) 
 
-3 ; -3 
 
-10; 0 
 
Deceive (a) 
 
0; -10 
 
-9; -9 
 
The game theoretical Nash equilibrium, in this case, is that the both parties are 
encouraged to deceive, as their economic or selfish utility is maximized in this way, no matter 
what the other party decides to select. This means that acting rationally both sides fail to reach 
the best “common good” scenario, i.e. mutually beneficial co-operation. Thus we can say 
rationality is not fruitful approach for the sake of common good in this scenario. The evidence 
of this experiment denies that rationality can be the main driver of trust (Harisalo & Miettinen 
2010). There has to be an institution preserved which keeps the parties from exploiting each 
other for their personal good as selfish strategy is not beneficial for the society as a whole. 
Based on this game-theoretical framework, trust can be seen as the main reason for why 
individuals do not necessarily pursue reaching to the selfish Nash equilibrium in prisoner’s 
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dilemma experiments, i.e. agents think about the common good rather than trying to reach their 
opportunistic goals. Trust is thus a social innovation which makes human beings to go beyond 
their self-interested rational calculation. In repeated games and multi-period experiments 
appears that trust is formed as there are more incentives to act reciprocally in multi-period or 
infinite-period settings (Lundberg & Pollak 1994; Harisalo & Miettinen 2010). This would 
suggest that the personal discount factor’s, i.e. time preferences have an impact on the level of 
trust in supply chains – the higher, the less trusting behavior. 
Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010) describes in their book “Trust Theory” that the 
prisoner’s dilemma situation in the context of trust is a belief that the trustee Y will act 
favorably to the trustor X even if this act would not be the most convenient one from the point 
of view of his most selfish private motives. This means that when X trusts Y, and Y is 
responding favorably, Y is adopting some of the X’s motives, i.e. showing signs of empathy 
and altruism. However, they underline rationality does not equal selfishness. 
The literature review of this section would indicate that the explanatory power of 
knowledge-based trust is greater than the calculus-based trust as the rational calculation cannot 
fully explain why people act reciprocally, not selfishly, in these game-theoretical settings. The 
game-theoretical setting is elaborated more in section 3, where the theoretical framework 
(Framework A) is formed. 
 
2.3 Trust and Supply Chain Management 
How should we study trust relationships further to get a sound and holistic picture of trust 
phenomenon in supply chain context? This section, 2.3, focuses on how the trust theories and 
concepts, reviewed in section 2.1 and 2.2, are related and applied in supply chain management 
context. 
 The philosophy of Supply Chain Management (SCM) is seen as a system approach of 
looking the whole supply chain as larger than the sum of its parts; the chain as a single entity 
rather than a collection of fragmented functions (Ellram & Cooper 1990). Supply Chain 
Management can thus be seen as an approach to strategically coordinating business functions 
within and across firms in the supply chain for improving the long-term performance of the 
companies and the supply chain as whole (Mentzer et al. 2001). The goal and motive of SCM 
are to increase the competitive advantage of supply chains. 
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Trust and commitment are the major prerequisites for contiguous companies to form a 
strategic and systemic view of their actions i.e. “Supply Chain Orientation” (SCO). If three or 
more interconnected companies have mutual SCO, they will likely start to practice SCM 
integration. Supply chain management leads to information sharing, shared risks and rewards, 
cooperation, integration of key processes, and long-term relationships. The consequences of 
these are lower costs, improved customer value and competitive advantage (Mentzer et al. 
2001).  
 
2.3.1 Trust in Supply Chains 
Awareness concerning trust and its role in supply chain integration has been noted 
approximately since the late 1990’s. The more holistic supply chain collaboration mindset 
started to seriously challenge the traditional transaction cost theory by the end of 1990’s (e.g. 
Chiles & McMackin 1996). The new viewpoint was that as collaborating firms act together by 
sharing information, they have better chances to succeed in their strategic partnership. This 
first step of supply chain integration requires trust to work. The motto of the leading supply 
chain Professor Martin Christopher (1992) is “Supply chains compete, not companies.”  
Trust creates value in organizations in several ways: it enhances information flow and 
knowledge quality (Chiue et al. 2006). According to Coleman (1988) resources, which the 
companies are willing to share, depends on the level of the trust. As information sharing is 
transparent to the parties, and their key operations are strategically aligned, they can plan 
together the production coherently and improve their operations. Predictable and open 
relationships help to decrease transaction costs within a supply chain (Gulati 1995). 
According to Kwon & Suh (2004), “trust is a critical factor fostering the commitment 
among supply chain partners.” The results of Kwon & Suh’s study imply that trust decreases 
‘behavioral uncertainty’ and thus transaction costs in the supply chain as trust encourages 
information sharing among parties. A supply chain environment, which lacks trust leads to a 
situation where every transaction needs to be verified and monitored, increasing transaction 
costs – and vice versa. The study also finds out that supply chain partner’s reputation in the 
market has an active role in the trust building process. 
According to McGrath and Sparks (2005) “A great deal of time and effort are typically 
directed at guarding against opportunistic behavior on the part of the other party” in supply 
chain partnerships. Monitoring and gauging opportunism takes effort and thus create 
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transaction costs for parties. The atmosphere of trust decreases the need for contracting and 
monitoring. 
 A trust-based partnership by nature benefits both parties: stability, lesser organizational 
conflicts, and inclination and intention of working together and sharing information as well as 
benefits (Sahay 2003). In Sahay’s paper, he refers to Lewis’ study (2000), who states that the 
lack of trust is the most important reason why firms and their strategic relationships are not 
working as well as they should. Therefore, trust-building should be emphasized when building 
strategic relationships. 
Building trust in supply chains have some essential preconditions. First of all, the parties 
have to value the benefits and costs of the collaboration. The effects of cheating and staying in 
the relationship should be determined (Sahay 2003). The parties have to be convinced that their 
targets are consistent with each other and the incentives to collaborate, not deceive, are high 
enough for each party. 
Secondly, the other party has to be predictable (Sahay 2003). The other party’s reputation 
should be examined for the trustor to be convinced about his benevolence. This underlines 
again the fact that trust and reputation can be seen as a “track record” of past success of the 
company, i.e. capital. Trust can be as well based on recommendations i.e. reputation 
transference process “word-of-mouth”. 
Based on this part of the literature review, the following hypothesis is formed: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): “Trust is the most important prerequisite for successful supply chain 
management.”  
 
2.3.2 Factors affecting trust in supply chains 
As trust has the potential to lower transaction costs of the organization and enhance the 
collaboration, the factors which lead to trusting behavior in supply chains, should be examined. 
Trust exists if the collaborating companies have the confidence in the partner’s reliability 
(Morgan & Hunt 1994). This leads the company considering partnerships to reflect whether 
relying on the other one and thus accepting vulnerability, will bring more benefits than what 
the risks are of collaborating or not. 
 Some of the key factors affecting trust in a supply chain are asset specific investments, 
information sharing, partner’s reputation, perceived satisfaction or conflict and behavioral 
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uncertainty. Kwon’s paper (2004) studies these factors in the context of supply chain 
management. 
Specific asset investment means that the company is investing in certain assets, which 
are dedicated specially to collaborating with a certain partner, i.e. they have a higher value in 
particular relationship than outside of it (Klein 2010). This means that the switching costs are 
high for these investments when changing partner, and therefore the commitment to this 
partnership could be assumed to be longer-term and deeper than usual. Company A investing 
in a machine, which can be only used to produce unfinished products/components for company 
B, makes company A vulnerable for the choices of company B. Therefore, high amount of trust 
and usually some contracting is needed. A making this commitment signalizes to B that A is 
taking the relationship seriously. Asset-specific investments can be understood more broadly 
than the term ‘investment’ is usually considered. Besides machines and other ‘traditional 
tangible investments’, it also includes human capital, firm-specific knowledge, and R&D 
resources. 
 Behavioral uncertainty refers to the inability to predict the partner’s behavior or 
changes in an environment (Suh & Kwon 2006). If the supply chain partner is unpredictable, 
it will lower the trust in the supply chain as transaction costs rise because of increased 
monitoring and low predictability. Uncertainty arises from difficulties of monitoring the 
performance of transaction partners (Williamson 1985). Tackling the bullwhip effect will be 
hard in this situation. Behavioral uncertainty has a great statistically significant negative effect 
on trust in supply chains (Kwon 2004).  
 Information sharing is a key concept in the modern supply chain management 
literature. It is one of the most important innovations of modern SCM and has become an 
intensively studied field (Choi 2010).  Sharing data, say demand forecasts, inventory data and 
lead time estimations will help the parties to coordinate their actions minimizing “slack” and 
the use of unnecessary big inventory buffers, and so forth. Sharing and coordinating 
information right is one of the most essential ways to tackle the bullwhip effect and as well 
decrease the behavioral uncertainty in supply chains. Sharing information implies as well 
vulnerability, so the act is trust associated (Mishra 1996). Sharing information requires as well 
transparency and appropriate IT infrastructure to be efficient.  
 As it is concluded in previous chapters, reputation, formed in a temporal process of 
partners trusting each other, is a sign of one’s history as a reliable or unreliable partner. As the 
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reputation of a company can be communicated, for example, by word-of-mouth of (un)happy 
previous collaborators, it is assumed that reputation plays a role in trust-building. Trust and 
reputation can be propagated through references, recommendations, and customer reviews. It 
is fair to assume that, there is a vast amount of information about a company’s reputation in 
the markets. One of the concepts for trust propagation is the company brand, “a certificate of 
proven quality.” Blomqvist and Ståhle (2004) confirms as well the effect of reputation on trust 
building. They add that reputation includes as well the notion that one must prove oneself to 
be competent in addition to being reliable. 
 Perceived satisfactions refers simply to the perceived experience whether the service 
provided or good sold is meeting the expectations or not. Perceived seamlessness and 
efficiency leads to satisfaction and thus to higher reputation and builds up trust further. 
 The study of Kwon (2004) got statistically significant support for its hypothesis of 
positive impact between assets specific investments and trust. The link between behavioral 
uncertainty and lack of trust was even more important. Information sharing reduced 
significantly ‘behavioral uncertainty’, which in turn increased trust. In addition, ‘partner’s 
reputation’ has a significant impact on the level of trust. This finding indicates and confirms 
the common notion of trust-literature that every individual carries the burden or blessing of 
their reputations with them. ‘Partners reputation’ had the highest regression value of the 
variables in the study with a p-value less than 0,05 indicating a statistically significant 
relationship. 
 
2.3.3 The demand for trust in supply chains 
What are the fundamental reasons for trust having such a high importance on successful supply 
chain management? We should study this theme more closely to understand how supply chain 
dynamics work and thus why trust is so important for supply chains. The high demand for trust 
emerges in supply chains in situations where there are both asymmetric information and 
uncertainty (Agarwal et al. 2007). The parties need confidence that their partners are not willing 
to exploit their vulnerability. 
Cristopher and Lee (2001) argues that complexity and uncertainty can potentially drive 
supply chains into chaos (Figure 7). Factors like overreactions, mistrust, and distortion of 
knowledge are some of the most common factors why supply chains become often “nervous,” 
meaning that the parties in supply chain perceive the collaboration to be not under control. This 
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leads to higher volatility and inefficient inventory buffers, as everyone in the chains wants to 
secure their position. This nervousness leads to a short-term focus and sub-optimization instead 
of long-term focused holistic supply chain management. Trust is demanded for the supply chain 
not to be driven in chaos. 
 
Nervousness will eventually lead to the risk spiral, where confidence in order cycle 
time, given demand forecasts, delivery capability, manufacturing capacity, quality 
management, and service delivery will be lost Cristopher and Lee (2001). If trust weakens, the 
parties in the supply chain start to build up buffers to decrease their risk of running out of stock. 
This situation leads to longer pipelines, which ends up to the lack of visibility. Decreased 
visibility decreases the trust in supply chain, and the vicious cycle has emerged (Figure 7). As 
Christopher (1992) argues “supply chains compete, not companies,” the result might be that 
in the long run, all parties in the chain loses; supply chain risk will likely materialize in 
economic terms. 
As chaos emerges in the supply chain, the bullwhip effect will be more volatile leading 
to unpredictability. The supply chain will become more “nervous” and inefficient (Christopher 
& Lee 2001). Preventing this nervousness and chaos, which leads to mistrust, creates the 
demand for trust in supply chains. Supply chain management cannot be efficient if the 
Lack of 
trust
Build-up 
of 
buffers
Long 
pipelines
Lack of 
visibility
RISK SPIRAL 
Figure 7: The Risk spiral according to Christopher & Lee (2001). 
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fundamental of trust is lost, and parties in the supply chain focus on hedging their own risks 
and starts to sub-optimize on the expense of the totality. 
 
2.3.3.1 The bullwhip effect 
The concept of bullwhip effect explains why collaboration in supply chains has to be confident 
and trust is needed as Christopher and Lee (2001) argues. The phenomena refer to the fact that 
the (even small) swings in customer demand are usually amplified the more, the further in 
supply chain we go, away from the original demand signal. Even little volatility in customer 
interface (downstream of the SC) can lead to a considerable volatility in the upstream of the 
supply chain. The longer the chain, the greater the effect becomes (Chen et al. 2000). This 
means that every new party, which increases the length of the supply chain, increases the 
amplitude of this effect in the upstream of the supply chain (Lee et al. 1997). The mechanism 
works like a bullwhip (See Figures 8 & 9). 
 
 
 
If the parties in a supply chain do not cooperate, communicate or change their 
information and forecast estimates enough, they are unable to predict the demand and thus they 
will build up high safety stocks and drive the supply chain eventually in chaos (Christopher & 
Lee 2001). The greater the safety stocks, the less is the organization able to be ‘lean’ and 
efficient and the more they have slack, i.e. additional capacity only to deal with the uncertainty.  
 
End-customer 
interface 
Length from the downstream 
Figure 8: The bullwhip effect. CC BY-SA 3.0 (wikimedia commons). 
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More importantly, acting in this type of supply chain is by its nature very uncertain and 
volatile as the Beer Distribution Game -experiment founded by MIT demonstrates efficiently. 
The lack of communication even in a simple experiment creates a high amount of inefficiency 
and behavioral uncertainty (Thompson & Badizadegan 2015).  
To tackle this effect, the supply chain needs to recognize the problem and coordinate its 
production with some forecast-driven model. This means the companies in the supply chain 
needs to communicate and share information about their stock levels, production plans, and 
inventories as well as lead times. The party in the customer interface needs to share historical 
data and conduct forecasts about anticipated future demand so that the whole chain can act 
accordingly in harmony, and therefore minimize additional safety stocks.  
Implementing the right processes to tackle this effect requires a high amount of trust in 
the supply chain as new technologies and several inter-organizational policies, processes, and 
decision-making mechanism has to be established.  
Tackling bullwhip effect requires communication, sharing of information and processes 
aligned accordingly. Supply chain management is essentially about managing information flow 
(Lambert et al. 1998) and inter-functional coordination (Mentzer et al. 2001) in the chain.  
Tackling the bullwhip phenomenon efficiently creates high demand for trust and is 
essentially one of the root causes why ‘supply chain management’ is needed in the first place. 
It also strengthens one of the assumptions of this thesis that “trustful collaboration” is the 
Figure 9: Bullwhip effect in a supply chain (CC BY-SA 3.0, user Grap, wikimedia commons). 
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fundamental key to efficient supply chain management, not necessarily the newest 
technologies. Based on this part of literature review the following hypothesis is made: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): “Sharing information among supply chain partners increases the level of 
trust in the supply chain.” 
 
2.3.4 Social capital 
Social capital can be associated in the context of supply chain management as the human 
element of the research field (McGrath & Sparks 2005). The topic is relevant for this thesis 
because social capital is highly related to the concept of trust capital in which this study 
partially focuses on. 
The idea of social capital in supply chain context includes the traits of learning, trust, 
and innovation, which are “created and enhanced during interpersonal interactions” 
(McGrath & Sparks 2005). Social capital affects the level of trust in supply chains 
positively. Cohen and Prusak define social capital as “the stock of active connections among 
people: the trust, mutual understanding and shared values and behaviors that bind the 
members of human networks and communities and make cooperative action possible” (2001 
as cited in McGrath & Sparks 2005). 
Social capital allows the companies in a supply chain to focus on the essential value-
creation instead of guarding their interest against opportunistic behavior. It lowers transaction 
costs and allows the company to be more efficient. Maula et al. (2003) argue “The more firms 
can build and leverage social capital in their internal and external relationships, the argument 
goes, the greater will be the potential value creation benefits that firms can expect as a result.” 
Coleman (1988) defines the core elements of social capital to be networks between actors. 
 A study conducted by Krause et al. (2007) finds support to the hypothesis “the 
performance of buying company is positively related to buyer commitment and social capital 
accumulation with key suppliers.” The firms that are acting together create a sort of “cognitive 
capital” as they understand each other, way they behave and their needs better. This capital 
creates more flexibility, better product quality and increases the performance of the supply 
chain. Commitment to a longer-term relationship is the prerequisite for these benefits. From 
perspective of trust building, the social capital factor is mostly related to the context factor ‘C,’ 
described in section 2.1.2. 
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Müller (2014) summarizes (Table 2) the benefits of social capital in supply chains as 
follows. Social Capital gives several advantages in different decision points when managing a 
supply chain. The benefits include increased flexibility and performance. The study concludes 
that increased cognitive capital in the sense of deepening understanding of the partner is highly 
sensitive for acquiring cost improvements. According to the study, the theory of social capital 
grants a deeper perspective to supply chain management compared to the traditional transaction 
cost theory, which is a relevant argument concerning the 4th research question of this thesis. 
 
 
Table 2: Improvements of supply chain collaboration with social capital according to Müller (2014). 
 
Decision 
points 
 
Make or buy 
 
Accurate risk assessment 
through informal 
information 
 
Sourcing strategies 
 
Ensuring comformity among 
offshore suppliers 
 
Supplier strategies  
 
Establishment of a deeper and 
more valuable relationship 
 
Contracting 
 
Creating a win-win 
situation 
 
Social 
Capital 
Theory 
 
-  High information 
sharing 
- More bargaining power 
due to unique access to 
information and 
resources 
- Better risk assessment 
 
- Improved relations with 
offshore suppliers 
- Continuous progression of 
competencies and skills of 
employees 
- Encouraged information 
sharing 
 
- Enhanced obtainment of 
benefits of supplier 
development 
- Beneficial value adding on 
both sides 
- Creating of competitive 
advantage 
 
- Partnership 
formation 
- Establishment of 
trust among contract 
partners enhances 
beneficial outcomes 
for both side. 
 
 
2.4 The nature of knowledge and social reality in supply chains 
“While tacit knowledge can be possessed by itself, explicit knowledge must 
rely on being tacitly understood and applied.  Hence all knowledge is 
either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge.  A wholly explicit knowledge is 
unthinkable.” – Michael Polanyi (1969) 
Given the collaboration and trust between people and firms in a supply chain is pivotal for the 
supply chain collaboration to be beneficial, it is relevant to study the nature of knowledge 
between people and how it can be managed in an organization. From this point of view, it is 
crucial for the whole supply chains to engage sound knowledge management across the parties 
involved. In further this section, 2.4, the nature of knowledge and social reality is studied to 
understand the circumstances and the human context where trust is accumulated and needed. 
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2.4.1 Two categories of knowledge 
English philosopher and political theorist, Michael Oakeshott divides knowledge into two 
categories: practical and scientific knowledge (Oakeshott 1991). Nobelist F. A. Hayek and 
Michael Polanyi creates a similar distinction by dividing knowledge into two categories: the 
first one is explicit knowledge, which can be articulated. The other category is tacit knowledge, 
which is practical and hard to articulate (Table 3). 
As an example, driving a bicycle is tacit knowledge, as it is hard to articulate; one just 
learns it by a process of trial and error. Forming trust happens as well unarticulated by the 
subjective evaluation of the trustor. It involves evolutionary-like trial-and-error experimenting 
as well as reciprocity. 
Hayek’s (1988) distinction is that knowledge is either centralized or dispersed. A 
cornerstone of his theory of Austrian economics is that essentially all knowledge is widely 
dispersed across people in an economy and thus it is impossible for a planned economy to be 
efficient, as it is impossible to transfer or process all the relevant information by a central 
planner (Hayek 1988). Communicating specific knowledge within an organization can be costly 
and hard. The implication is that organization dealing with tacit information should be 
decentralized by their nature (Lazear and Gibbs 2009). 
 
Table 3: Two types of Knowledge (Huerta de Soto 2008). 
Types of knowledge Type 1 (explicit) Type 2 (tacit) 
F. A. Hayek Centralized Dispersed 
Michael Polanyi Articulate Tacit 
Michael Oakeshott Scientific (technical) Practical (traditional) 
 
  
 
Oakeshott argues that the fundamental nature of all knowledge is practical and 
subjective. He criticizes the type of rationalism, which does not recognize the primary type of 
knowledge to be practical, but that “there is no knowledge which is not scientific/technical 
knowledge” (Oakeshott 1991). 
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Hayek (1988) and Huerta de Soto (2008) argues that social institutions such as habits, 
traditions, institutions, and juridical and moral rules, which make society possible, are deeply 
inarticulate by their nature. Human beings learn to follow these institutions by gaining practical 
knowledge through living in reality, though they might not know the complexity or “reasoning” 
behind these institutions. People are used to adapting to their social environment and its rules.  
According to Huerta de Soto (2008) the link between type 1 and type 2 knowledge (See 
Table 3) is complex. All scientific information is fundamentally based on practical knowledge. 
However, the accumulation of better scientific knowledge also allows better use of practical 
knowledge. Thus there is a two-way link between these knowledge categories. The scientific 
(or explicit) knowledge is accumulated from the foundations of practical knowledge. Polanyi 
(1969) argues all knowledge is fundamentally tacit by its nature or at least rooted in tacit 
knowledge because the explicit knowledge is always tacitly understood and applied. In this 
sense, tacit knowledge can be viewed as the “first order knowledge”. 
 From the perspective of this study, the key epistemological finding is that the explicit 
articulate knowledge is always based on the tacit/practical knowledge. The inarticulate, tacit 
knowledge is a result of a temporal process formed by experience and is often hard to describe 
in words. Building trust is about creating subjective evaluations of the other parties in the 
supply chain based on their action. Trust-building happens step-by-step evolutionary as the 
agent X acquires information about the trustee Y. The trustor must gather information about 
agents whether or not they can be trusted. This process is therefore essentially tacit. 
From the point of view of supply chain integration, interpersonal relationships between 
corresponding actors across the companies should be established for them to create common 
understanding. This involves especially the communicating and sharing of tacit knowledge, 
which can be hard and costly to transfer. It is crucial because failure to communicate is one of 
the main reasons why strategic supply chain alliances many times fail. Studying the nature of 
social reality and human knowledge helps, therefore, to understand how trust is formed. 
 
2.4.2 Knowledge management in supply chains 
As we notice from the previous section, there are broadly two categories of knowledge explicit 
and tacit ones. It is thus important to examine the many natures and types of knowledge as 
collaboration in supply chains is highly built on competitive advantages, which require open 
 Literature review 
 
 36  
 
sharing of knowledge (Barrat 2004). From the point of view of trust-building, we should study 
how trust enables the process of knowledge management, sharing, creation, and exploitation.  
The study conducted by Schoenherr et al. (2014) suggests that supply chain knowledge 
management influences the supply chain performance. They argue that suppliers are not only 
there to provide goods and services, but “key repositories of knowledge and capabilities” for 
buyers and vice versa. High social capital between the parties in the supply chain has a strong 
effect on this information accumulation (Adler & Kwon 2002). 
Supply chain members contribute to the common “knowledge pool” simultaneously 
elevating the sophistication of the knowledge. Supply chain knowledge management is 
therefore about collecting pieces of information within the chain and processing it to build 
competitive advantages. Therefore, organizations should establish processes to acquire 
knowledge and to converse it to meaningful understanding (or cognitive capital) and to be able 
to apply the information by utilizing it for the good of the whole supply chain.  
According to Fawcett et al. (2012) “Trust is at the heart of a collaborative innovation 
capability. Without a foundation of trust, collaborative alliances can neither be built nor 
sustained.” When there is trust in the supply chain, the actors in companies are allowed to 
access unique and more informal information through the weak ties. Mantel et al. (2006 as 
cited in Müller 2014) argue that “the informal sources of information are more credible and 
deliver higher quality information.” These weak ties are accessed by interpersonal 
relationships. Supply chain management requires, therefore, knowledge of relationship-
building skills (Kwon 2004). This indicates that building trust is crucial in terms of knowledge 
management in supply chain collaboration. 
The possession of “valuable, inimitable, rare and non-substitutable knowledge” can 
be seen as a competitive advantage for an organization (Grant 1996; Spender & Grant 1996; 
Schoenherr et al. 2014). The knowledge, which is generated through the interaction of the 
parties in the supply chain, can potentially improve the interface between parties by enabling 
better integration and enabling more efficient supply chain processes. In fact, the mutual 
generation and exploitation of knowledge itself is the main driver for supply chain 
relationships (Lanier et al. 2010). This fact concerns both tacit and explicit types of knowledge. 
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2.4.2.1 The role of explicit knowledge in supply chains 
Explicit knowledge is considered as easier to conceptualize and articulate as the tacit 
information. It is as well easier to communicate in manuals, forecasts, company policies, 
regulations and market data. An ordinary example of this would be for instance companies 
communicating statistical forecasts with each other to adjust their production according to 
predicted demand. 
Typical ways of transferring this type of knowledge in an organization include 
structured meetings, archive storages, shared databases and so forth. The shared explicit 
information increases the supply chain performance according to Schoenherr et al. (2014) but 
does not so as efficiently as tacit knowledge. 
 
2.4.2.2 The role of tacit knowledge in supply chains 
There is a remarkable distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge. What is interesting 
from the point of view of this study, is the fact that the tacit knowledge, i.e. non-explicit and 
hard-to-communicate knowledge, has a stronger effect on the supply chain performance than 
the explicit knowledge (Schoenherr et al. 2014).  
 When communicating, the supply chain partners create a common social reality. 
Tacit knowledge is made easier to flourish in group sessions such as brainstorming, lobby 
discussions, coffee breaks, formal meetings, informal meetings and communication between 
cross-company specialist (Schoenherr et al. 2014). In logistics and supply chain context it is 
important that the individuals across companies who are at the interface points between 
businesses in supply chains have right conditions to communicate their explicit and tacit 
knowledge. 
 The collaboration between parties in the supply chain network requires the exchange 
of ideas to happen in an open environment with an as low threshold as possible. This allows a 
higher level of thinking as other supply chain members build their ideas on each other’s 
experience & knowledge and share their understanding by having creative dialogue. No parties 
should be feeling that they need to be reserved (Harisalo & Miettinen 2010). 
Tacit knowledge is difficult to transfer, but it is useful as it is tough to replicate i.e. it is 
unique and complex. As Polanyi puts the words: “We know more than we can tell.” Squeezing 
the tacit knowledge out from the interactions of supply chain collaborators creates valuable 
knowledge resources for the companies. As tacit knowledge is harder to imitate by competitors, 
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it is more likely to be a more sustainable competitive advantage than explicit knowledge, which 
is easier to imitate. 
Taking this finding into account, building trust requires better ways to communicate 
tacit knowledge between supply chain parties. Trust building is essentially about acquiring 
tacit, experience-based, knowledge of the trustee in a temporal process. 
According to Schoenherr (2014), open sharing of knowledge allows the increase of supply 
chain performance. A crucial precondition for this is trusting as it is demonstrated earlier in 
this thesis. When supply chain parties collaborate, they will be able to create a more elusive 
type of tacit knowledge. This implies pairing the different parties to be able to share ideas 
(Schoenherr et al. 2014). Tacit knowledge is about making sense of available information in 
complex realities and acquiring new viewpoints to create new meanings (Nonaka 1994). 
Koka and Prescott study the strategic alliances of firms operating in the steel industry in 
their paper published 2002. They found out that the theory of social capital, based on trust, 
explains three benefits of collaboration regarding information sharing. They are information 
volume, information richness, and information diversity. Out of these three benefits, only 
information richness is significantly dependent on the “experience and history of the 
companies in this relationship.” This finding supports the observation that the sharing of the 
highly rich and valuable, but elusive, information improves in a temporal trust process between 
the companies as trust capital is accumulated. 
As a conclusion of this theorization, tacit knowledge enables even a greater effect on the 
performance of the supply chain than the explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is more context 
specific and ambiguous and cannot be copied or imitated as explicit knowledge. This is true 
because tacit knowledge is more often “valuable, inimitable, rare and non-substitutable” as 
Grant (1996) describes the main properties of the type of knowledge, which creates sustainable 
competitive advantages for organizations. This process is heavily dependent on the level of 
trust between organizations. 
 
2.4.3 Collective learning in supply chains 
As we have discovered, the right type of valuable tacit knowledge is a fundamental key to 
sustainable competitive advantages for the supply chain. This implies that it is beneficial to 
study the organizational structures, which enable knowledge creation and enhancement. The 
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concept of collective learning is important in the context of supply chain management as it 
describes how knowledge (explicit and tacit) is created and flourished in the supply chains 
(Ghosh & Fedorowicz 2008). It is related to the concept of cognitive capital, i.e. learning by 
collaboration. A framework for supply chain coordination and governance should be 
established. 
The results of coordination and governance in supply chains lead to a feedback system 
and collective learning when supply chain shares its information among parties involved. The 
collective learning is related to trust: it is a process where knowledge is created in a multi-
period temporal setting. As the coordinating of the supply chain is centralized and the 
governance framework is solid, the members can learn from each other’s mistakes and best 
practices. The parties also learn that neglecting information sharing leads to sub-optimal 
performance (Ghosh & Fedorowicz 2008). 
Collective learning as well creates circumstances for innovations to flourish as the 
product development, and R&D is coordinated in the feedback process (Simatupang et al. 
2002). An innovative environment requires trust and openness, which allows people to speak 
up about their minds and also to have differing opinions (Prather 2000). Collective learning 
creates a learning curve for the organizations and deepens the trust between the participants in 
the process. These situations can be potentially used to share knowledge and create new 
information to be exploited by the organization. 
Conditions to collective learning should be established as it makes possible for the 
supply chain to take advantage of its parties’ knowledge resources. It should also be noted that 
learning to work in a team is as well process learned by time. “Supply chain collaboration can 
be only learned by supply chain collaboration” and therefore the learning process with a 
feedback link is essential (Ghosh & Fedorowicz 2008). 
Based on these findings, it could be argued that collective learning increases cognitive 
capital in the supply chain and grants access to silent knowledge on how the other parties in 
supply chain think, act and comprehend the social reality. An atmosphere of trust lays a 
cornerstone for this process as Figure 10 indicates. 
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Figure 10: Collective learning (Ghosh & Fedorowicz 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on this part, I form the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): “Finding the right ways of cooperation in supply chain that works, takes 
time and is an iterative process of trial and error by its nature.” 
 
2.5 Trust and transaction cost economics 
As it was discussed in the introduction section and literature review, there is a conflict between 
the calculus-based theory of trust and the knowledge-based theory. The calculus-based theory 
is associated with the transaction costs economics (TCE), which is covered in this section. It 
is unclear, which of the two theories have more explanatory power in supply chain management 
context. 
The calculus-based theory is mostly founded on the disciple of microeconomics and 
rational calculation, while the theories emphasizing knowledge-based trust are more 
interdisciplinary (elaborated in the previous sections). Referring to research question 4, it is 
finally studied in the empirical section which of the theories have more explanatory power in 
supply chain context (see section 4.4.2). Therefore, the theory of calculus-based trust is 
reviewed in this chapter. 
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Williamson (2008) discusses the relationship of supply chain management and 
transaction cost economics (TCE) in his research paper in the April’s 2008 volume of Journal 
of Supply Chain Management. He questions the issue that whether the encompassing nature of 
SCM gives too many degrees of freedom so that basically “anything can be explained as supply 
chain management.” Therefore, it is reasonable to review some literature on transaction cost 
economics/analysis of supply chains and especially their views on trust. 
Williamson (2008) assesses trust in supply chain context through transaction cost 
economics (TCE) point of view. The transaction cost theory in supply chain collaboration is 
based on the notion that the heaviest risks in collaboration are highly related to firm’s asset 
specific investments. In transaction economics point of view, non-asset specific products might 
be purchased through efficient markets without complex contracting and arrangements 
(Williamson 2008). There is no need for the seller and buyer to integrate their processes with 
each other so heavily because there are zero risky asset specific investments needed. 
 However, when asset specificity from the partner is required, the firm needs to think 
about whether to “make or buy" carefully. If the goods or components needed requires asset 
specific investments from the supplier, there have to be made a decision whether the supplier 
gets some safeguards from the buyer. “The fact that transaction-specific investments cannot 
be easily redeployed gives rise to a safeguarding problem, which can result in potential costs” 
(Suh & Kwon 2006). 
If no safeguards, such as contracts on long-term collaboration, are granted, the seller 
might ask for a high premium, because asset specific investments are very risky. Asset specific 
investments can turn out to be a high financial burden for the seller if the buyer decides to stop 
the collaboration and the seller is left with high sunken costs of the firm-specific asset 
investment, i.e. realizing risks of collaboration (Williamson 2008). 
If the safeguards are needed: there are two alternatives: hybrid contracting (equivalent to 
supply chain collaboration) and complete vertical integration (make it yourself). Hybrid 
contracting should be assessed from the point of view that how complex contracting and other 
arrangements are required. If the contracting needed is too complex, the transaction costs are 
much higher than those of making the product by the company itself. In this case, vertical 
integration and internal production should be established further (Williamson 2008). 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) literature tends to view the role of trust more from 
the perspective of calculative trust than from the knowledge-based perspective. The transaction 
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cost analysis and its calculus-based view on trust seem to conflict with the knowledge-based 
theory, which is interesting from the point of view of this study. Therefore, questions about the 
explanatory powers of these theories should be asked and tested. 
 Suh and Kwon (2006) argues that calculative-based theory of trust has better explaining 
power than the knowledge-based theory of trust in supply chains. Their study claims that firms’ 
trust in their supply chain partner is highly related to the partner company’s firm-specific 
investments, i.e. “variety of relationship-specific investments, including both specialized 
physical and human capital, along with intangible such as R&D and firm specific knowledge” 
(Shelanski & Klein 1995).  
From Suh and Kwon’s calculus-based trust perspective, it is important that the partner 
company demonstrate a deep commitment to investing in the relationship and thus showing 
that they are seriously long-term committed in the partnership. They view that “matter comes 
over mind” i.e. concrete acts and investments create a more profound base for trust than 
studying the “minds” of the partner, i.e. the knowledge-based view. However, McAllister 
(1995) argues that rational choice and calculative explanations for trust are limited and narrow 
perspectives for trusting because they fail to provide any explanations about the cognitive and 
affectional side of trust.  
Suh and Kwon find a low amount of evidence on the knowledge-based theory that trust 
is built in a temporal process by time with learning about the other participant because in their 
study the variable years in partnership does not explain at all statistically significantly the level 
of trust in supply chain collaboration. If knowledge-based theory had higher explanatory 
power, a relationship would be found. This creates tensions with the literature, which promotes 
the knowledge-based view.  
Based on their framework Suh and Kwon finds a highly statistically significant 
evidence that partner’s asset specific investments create trust. However, this effect is smaller 
when the respondent firm is highly replaceable, i.e. the effect of asset specify on trust is 
moderated in this case. No evidence of years in partnership or experience in supply chain 
management’s positive or negative relationship with trust was found. Furthermore, behavioral 
uncertainty had a great statistically significant and strong effect on trust.  
Based on this section and the conflicting views of knowledge-based and calculus-based 
trust as the most explanatory form of trust, the following hypothesis is formed: 
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Hypothesis 7 (H7): “Knowledge-based view on trust explains better the phenomenon of trust 
in supply chain context than calculus-based trust.” 
 
 
 
2.6 Ways to enhance trust building in Supply Chains 
As the fifth research question of this thesis is related to study the ways how trust building can 
be encouraged to increase the performance of supply chains, it is necessary to explore the 
aspect further in the literature review section. The focus is reviewing existing literature from 
the perspective that what kind of normative solutions companies should implement to 
encourage trust-building and thus increasing performance. This part focuses on more concrete 
proposals in contrast to the much more theoretical previous sections. 
 
2.6.1 Affinity groups 
One solution for increasing social capital in supply chains and thus building trust are the 
‘affinity groups,’ i.e. “semiformal groups that cut across the supply chain structure”. They are 
Partner’s Asset 
Specifity 
Respondent’s 
Asset Specifity 
Trust 
Respondents 
Replaceability 
(moderator) 
Partner’s 
Replaceablity 
(moderator) 
 Behavioral uncertainty 
 Years in Partnership 
 Experience 
Risk-decreasing 
Risk-increasing 
Figure 11: Conceptual framework of Suh & Kwon (2006). 
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formed based on responsibilities and duties of the individuals in a supply chain network 
opposed to the organizational division to departments and divisions (McGrath & Sparks 2005).  
Affinity groups are a way to build more social capital and thus trust among the supply 
chain partners. These groups consist of peer members who share the same responsibilities, 
similar roles or job titles in different organizations in the supply chain (McGrath & Sparks 
2005). This means that their work in different organizations is highly related to each other’s 
work. As the people in affinity groups are professionals in their specific fields, they can share 
valuable information and thus create new (tacit) knowledge with the help of more informal 
channels, fostering the creation of silent knowledge, as described in section 2.4.2.2.  
These networks can enhance the collective learning in an organization as the 
participants are allowed to share their thoughts and concerns about what is working and what 
is not. It can be thus assumed that affinity groups, a cross cut of the supply chain, is an enhanced 
form of collective learning as Ghosh and Fedorowicz (2008) describes this phenomenon. Team 
members do share critical information through the supply chain as for example logistics 
experts, marketing experts or R&D developers speak the same language (‘jargon’) with each 
other. This encourages creative problem solving and collaboration, as members can creatively 
think “outside of their organizational box” and thus solve shared problems efficiently 
(McGrath & Sparks 2005). 
These examples highlight and suggests that it is beneficial for example for the people 
working in intersections between two companies, in a supply chain, to have an interpersonal 
relationship because they need to understand each other. Representatives of procurement unit 
of company A and sales unit of company B should work in close cooperation if the theory of 
social capital and affinity groups tend to be correct and beneficial for the companies. As 
McGrath and Sparks (2005) describe it, “affinity groups, collegial associations of peers who 
meet on regular basis to share information and capture emerging opportunities, offer a unique 
opportunity to enhance supply chain management.” 
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2.6.2 Signaling trust and commitment 
In economics the aspect of signaling is a part of contract theory that describes situations when 
a party signalizes credibly some information about himself to the other party. A common factor 
is the existence of asymmetries of information: one of the parties knows more than the other. 
Therefore, it is beneficial to study carefully whether some signals about trusting are more 
credible than others. Theories about signaling are useful for example in the job market contexts 
(Spence 1973). Credible and reliable signaling is crucial in many economic contexts to tackle 
the negative adverse selection phenomena, such as in company IPO’s. In order to be reliable, 
the signals have to be too expensive to be performed by the ‘bad apples’ in the markets (Leland 
and Pyle 1977). 
 
  
In supply chain context it is relevant to study which actions build up trust. When starting 
a new companionship between organizations, it is necessary to signalize that the relationship 
is based on a genuine notion of commitment, reliability (Noteboom 2002) and mutual benefit, 
not on opportunistic behavior where one of the parties use the circumstances to exploit the 
gullibility of the other at the right moment. The parties should not get the feeling that one of 
them considers opportunism as a morally acceptable behavior in certain circumstances. 
Creating interpersonal trust is a gradual process. Concerning signaling it is useful to 
notice the widely confirmed fact that beliefs create self-fulfilling prophecies (Zand 1997). This 
A's 
perception
A's 
conclusion
A's action
B's 
perception
B's 
conclusion
B's action
Figure 12: Interactive model of trust building (Zand 1972; Six 2007). 
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underlines the importance of signaling about trustworthiness in the early phase of the 
relationships and giving good reasons for other party think favorably about the signaling party.  
Zand 1972 describes trust as a process where trust building is interactive. According to 
Six and Noteboom (2005) “People interpret actions as relational signals, on the basis of which 
they attribute a mental frame to others, and select their own frame as a basis for action.” As 
trust is based on action, but more importantly on perceptions – the signaling effect is crucial 
when forming new interpersonal relationships. F. E. Six (2007) proposes four normative 
policies in his extensive framework to enhance inter-personal trust building in organizational 
context. These are: 
1. the suspension of opportunistic behavior, or the removal of distrust. 
2. exchange of positive relational signals (mutuality) 
3. avoiding negative relational signals, i.e., dealing with trouble. 
4. the stimulation of frame resonance, or the introduction of trust-enhancing 
organizational policies. 
This framework encourages the companies to remove distrust between each other. This 
deals with any kind of attitude, which will wake concerns in the other supply chain member, 
that one is in the collaboration with a “strategically opportunistic motive”, i.e. deceiving when 
the time is right. 
The solutions for removing distrust is the alignment of interest through credible 
commitments and with reputational data from third party endorsements (Six 2007). In supply 
chain context this could mean signaling with offering long-term contracts (Williamson 2008), 
making mutually asset-specific investments (Suh & Kwon 2005; Fawcett et al. 2012) and 
sharing voluntary information, and maybe even giving a discount to the other party if the 
organization is willing to share information and knowledge. 
Removing distrust is the first prerequisite to for trust-building process to start. As beliefs 
are positive about the other party, a genuine trust-building and the positive self-fulfilling 
prophesy may start. 
 
2.6.2.1 Organizational policies 
The fourth point of these normative proposals for enhancing trust building, the introduction of 
trust enhancing organizational policies, is something relevant to study more. The organizations 
might encourage by its policies the creation of inter-personal relationships. One application of 
 Literature review 
 
 47  
 
this is establishing autonomous affinity groups mentioned in section 2.6.1. The theme is tough 
wider than this. 
 As context has a significant effect on trust building, it is beneficial for the company to 
form policies and organizational structures, which encourage the formation of interpersonal 
trust. One of the most important points in this is creating a culture where relationships are 
important and showing care and concern for other people’s needs. New employees should be 
accommodated to the shared values and principles of the organization (Six 2007). 
If the employee needs to be controlled, it signalizes that the employer does not have trust 
in the subordinates. Bureaucratic control of employees often signalizes lack of trust (Das and 
Teng 1998). When signalizing trust, a right degree of freedom should be granted to the 
employee to give a sound signal of trust and thus to empower the subordinates. 
Fawcett et al. (2012) suggest that in order to build trust in supply chains, the company 
should align right incentives for collaboration, i.e. there need to be some metrics and concrete 
goals established to reward trustworthy behavior. A company should cultivate a collaborative 
philosophy and establish trust building organizational routines. Trust is highly needed when 
for example a pilot project is conducted by the firms. Fawcett et al.’s model (Figure 13) is 
similar to Six’s model and emphasizes the virtue of reciprocity and signaling of goodwill. As 
trust consists of goodwill and competence, both of these trust components should be 
highlighted (Fawcett et al. 2012). Building trust is therefore about building empathy, 
benevolence & goodwill among the parties. It is as much about building competence (skills, 
results, and know-how). 
Figure 13: Fawcet et al's framework on Trust & Collaboration (2012). 
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3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Based on the literature review of this thesis I will continue to build a sound framework of trust-
building from the perspective of supply chain management using the tools of game theory, 
discounted utility of finance theories and transaction cost economics (TCE) (Framework A).  
In section 4 some theoretical implications based on this model are tested empirically by 
a questionnaire for logistics managers of companies whom business is heavily dependent on 
intensive supply chain collaboration. This section begins by making the theoretical argument 
why trust is fundamentally based on the tacit type of knowledge. Then the Framework A will 
be built further based on the literature review part. 
 
3.1 Trust as tacit knowledge 
Based on the literature review section, it is reasonable to argue that the attitude of trusting 
someone and building an evaluation of the trustfulness of someone is in fact deeply tacit 
knowledge; hard to articulate, hard to communicate and dispersed. This is a cornerstone of the 
Framework A of this thesis (elaborated further in Section 3.2) and tested by Hypothesis 9 (H9).  
The evaluation of someone’s trustfulness is profoundly subjective, and all the nuances 
of this kind of assessment are hard to conceptualize in words. This evaluation is manifested 
through the actions of the trustor. When Saint Augustine was asked to describe ‘What is time?’, 
he got confused and answered: “Before anyone asked, I knew what time was, but now as you 
ask me to describe it, I cannot say what time is.” Harisalo and Miettinen (2010) argue that the 
same situation is true with the concept of trust. They argue that it is hard to verbalize what 
people feel and think inside their heads when it comes to trust. Trust is thus complex and 
ambiguous in its core sense (Jarrat & Ceric 2015). 
 Tacit or practical knowledge is as well characterized to be acquired in an evolutionary 
process of trial and error. Tacit knowledge is acquired by learning through practical experience. 
It cannot be deducted logically as explicit knowledge often can (Polanyi 1958). Trust is as well 
only learned by interaction in practical context since forming trust is a process. Trust cannot 
be deducted with a fully rational a priori reasoning. 
 The third similarity with tacit knowledge and trust is that explicit knowledge can be 
stored in one place theoretically (like collections of encyclopedias and data banks), but trust 
and tacit knowledge cannot. The attitude of trusting is always subjective and depends on the 
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evaluator. Therefore, all the “trust evaluations” cannot be stored into a one place or database, 
as they lay in people’s minds as highly ambiguous and complex schemas and beliefs. Trust 
evaluations are dispersed in society and cannot be “stored” explicitly in one certain place since 
trust is subjective and context dependent. 
Table 4: Comparison of explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge, and trust. Based on Polanyi (1958). 
Explicit knowledge Tacit knowledge Trust (evaluation) 
 
 
EK can be articulated easily 
and written down. 
Transferring explicit 
knowledge is easy. 
 
Transferring tacit knowledge 
require intense and close 
interaction and to build 
shared understanding among 
parties. Difficult to transfer. 
 
Trust is formed in a process 
where parties interact 
together and build 
evaluations based on each 
other’s actions. Deep trust 
requires shared 
understanding. Trust can be 
transferred by propagation. 
 
Logical and deductive 
reasoning can accumulate 
explicit knowledge. 
 
Tacit knowledge can only be 
acquired in relevant context 
by practical experience. 
 
Trust is context dependent 
and subjective of its nature. 
Trust is accumulated 
through experience. 
 
 
Can be aggregated in a 
single location and “stored” 
for future generations. 
 
Personal knowledge that is 
dispersed across the 
mankind. Realizing this type 
of knowledge requires 
connecting with other one’s 
mindset and way of 
thinking. 
 
Trust is dependent on the 
notion that who is the 
trustor. Trust evaluations are 
always by definition 
dispersed. 
 
 The notion of trust being complex phenomena is important to pay attention to since 
building and sharing tacit knowledge is a bigger competitive advantage than sharing and 
producing explicit knowledge. This observation hints that communicating, sharing and 
producing tacit knowledge should be heavily emphasized in supply chain collaboration. Taking 
into account the findings of Lanier et al. (2010) the mutual generation and exploitation of 
knowledge itself is the main driver for supply chain relationships.  
Therefore, this theoretical reasoning suggests that the type of information, which 
increases the competitive advantage of the supply chain most - tacit knowledge, can be 
regarded as the most valuable priority of supply chain management. Creation of highly valuable 
tacit knowledge is not possible without the atmosphere of trust as the most sophisticated type 
of knowledge is created in interpersonal relationships; with people of similar mindsets. The 
creation of high-flying complex schemas, mindsets, perspectives, ideas and practical 
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knowledge (the forms of tacit knowledge) require all reciprocal interaction – trust building. 
This notion is highlighted the more information intensive the supply chain and its products are. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses related to the tacit knowledge in supply chains are formed: 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): “Collecting and exploiting tacit knowledge in the supply chain is one of 
the most important factors that enables a competitive advantage for the supply chain.” 
 
Hypothesis 9 (H9): “The production and using of tacit knowledge in the supply chain 
partnership is related with high level of trust in the supply chain collaboration.” 
 
3.2 Framework A: Game theory, time preference, and trust 
The game theoretical view on trust uses experiments such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma to study 
how human beings behave in situations where trust is needed (Harisalo & Miettinen 2010). As 
the literature review suggests, the experiment changes when a temporal dimension is added, 
people start to act more reciprocally by time. 
Harisalo and Miettinen (2010) and many others describe trust as a process. The 
knowledge-based theory implies that trust is built on trial and error as the trustor’s knowledge 
of the trustee becomes higher and higher by time as they learn from each other and build a 
common mindset. Categories, which should be included in the frameworks based on these 
findings, are the game theoretical approach and the temporal dimension. 
It should be noted that according to the existing literature (Section 2), trust is lost more 
easily than acquired. It is generated slowly in a context ‘C’ with multiple parameters such as 
the cultural factors, nature of the social context, institutional aspects, contracts, tacit 
knowledge, social capital, the level of asset specify and so on. In the Framework A of this 
thesis, trust is generated through a temporal process of reciprocity, reputation and increased 
trust (capital) in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games as the Figure 14 demonstrates. The 
outcome of this process is the mutual net benefit (utility). The framework adopts features of 
Mui et al.’s model (2002) and extending it with the contextual component as well as an 
illustration about how trust capital is accumulated in this model, as the mechanics of trust 
accumulation is related to the 2nd research question. 
Figure 15 sketches a possible scenario of trust-building in Framework A (Figure 14) 
from the point of view of the trustor. Trust is built slowly but can be lost easily because people 
tend to be risk-averse. In this framework, trust is formed by small steps in a process gradually 
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(a), but potentially lost in a greater amount if the other agent is considered to act non-
reciprocally (deception) (b). The incentive to act according to reciprocity norm is formed as 
reputational mechanisms punishes heavily someone who is deemed to play unfairly against the 
established institutions such as common rules which the actors have agreed on. Trust can, 
however, be re-established, but that is harder after trust is considered to be lost once (c). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
trust
reciprocityreputation Net benefit 
(utility) 
Figure 14: Trust process of the Framework A adapted from Mui et al. (2002). 
Trust 
capital 
Time 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Figure 15: An example on how Trust is generated in the Framework A by time and interactions. 
Context 
 Cultural factors 
 Time-preferences 
 Asymmetry of information 
 Institutions, law-enforcement and contracts 
 Social capital 
 Explicit and Tacit knowledge 
 Costs and benefit 
 Reciprocity norm and sociologic aspects 
 Psychological factors 
 = xt 
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3.2.1 Discounted utility – Framework A 
According to the modern economics, most human beings tend to maximize their ‘utility’ or 
wellbeing with their actions. It should be however noted that people do not represent the ‘homo 
economicus’ species, but when we study trust with certain mathematical models, more or less 
rational behavior is witnessed by the cognitive actors. “Humans tend to be boundedly-
rational” (Yu 2015). 
As people tend to act in temporal context, they value the present moment on the expense 
of current moment, i.e. the model assumes most people have a positive time-preference: a 100-
dollar note is more valuable for the individual now than after three years (e.g. Zhang & Rashad 
2008). Based on these theoretical assumptions I will expand the Framework A on boundedly-
rational calculation and time-discounted utility model. This model does not tell the whole truth 
about human reasoning in the context of trust but describes it well enough to form certain 
implications of trust building. 
 The model is based on repeated games in a temporal context where actor’s X and Y act 
together either reciprocally or deceivingly. The outcomes of this game are based on several 
factors: the strategy of players, the net value of each choice for the players, their time-
preference (i.e. personal discount factors) (see Section 2.1.6) and how altruistic they are, i.e. 
willing to adapt others interests partially as their own. The utility for the player x is determined 
by the following equation: 
 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑋) = ∑
𝑥𝑡
(1 + 𝑑)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
=
𝑥1
(1 + 𝑑)1
+
𝑥2
(1 + 𝑑)2
+
𝑥3
(1 + 𝑑)3
…
𝑥𝑡
(1 + 𝑑)𝑇
 
 
 The constant d refers to the individual’s own time-preference, which describes how 
much the actor X favors the present moment at the expense of future income. (In this 
illustration the discount factor is assumed to be constant over time, though the reality might 
be more complex.) A high time-preference is typical for example drug addicts and highly 
correlated with impulsiveness (Kirby & Bickel 1999). It would be rational to assume that 
higher time-preference would correlate with a strategy of lesser trusting as high short-term 
profits might overwhelm the individual’s long-term losses as he or she appreciates the present 
very highly on the expense of future utility gains.  
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3.2.2 Game theoretical outcomes – Framework A 
The result of every game xt in Framework A is determined as follows. The participants play 
consecutive games where the outcome is one of the four: mutual cooperation or deception or 
a mixed game where either player X or Y play cooperation and the other deceits.  
 
Table 5: Prisoner's dilemma game, Framework A. 
 
Game of trust 
(Prisoner’s Dilemma) 
 
 
 
Co-operate (Y) 
 
 
 
Deceive (Y) 
 
Co-operate (X) 
 
C ; C 
 
B ; A 
 
Deceive (X) 
 
A ; B 
 
D ; D 
 
The Nash equilibrium is always mutual deception in a short-term game IF A > C > D > 
B. So the utility outcome in a short-term, self-interested game for both is always (D ; D). This 
result implies that no matter what the other participant chooses to do; the optimal strategy for 
X is always to deceive. As in this example, the outcomes for player X is bolded. Deceiving is 
the dominant strategy of both, and thus mutual deception is always favored (colored yellow). 
 
Table 6: Prisoner's dilemma, an example. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(Utility from years of 
imprisonment) 
 
 
Co-operate (Y) 
 
 
Deceive (Y) 
 
Co-operate (X) 
 
-2 ; -2 
 
-7 ; 0 
 
Deceive (X) 
 
0 ; -7 
 
-3 ; -3 
 
 The real world does not work as simplistically as this example demonstrates, but the 
idea is to get a grasp of the dynamics of trust. There are plenty of factors which affect the 
phenomena not included in this illustration such as the asymmetrical information, 
probabilities, and uncertainty, more than two options to select from, the possibility of trust 
games where Nash equilibrium or dominant strategies are something other than mutual 
deception. The world is also more complex in terms of the human cognition and psychology 
than this model based on rational calculus. However, this framework of trust building will 
give an idea about some of the factors affecting the process. 
xt = 
xt = 
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3.2.3 Effect of time preference – Framework A 
As we compare different strategies in a temporal context, the model works quite differently 
and favors different outcomes. (We continue the example with the prisoner’s dilemma game 
demonstrated in the previous section.) Let’s take a temporal game with four intervals. The 
counterparty, player Y is assumed to be cooperative as default, but to respond to deception 
with distrust. If we compare two different strategies where the first one, strategy A, is about 
cooperation and the strategy B is taking use of Y’s trust in t=1, leading to distrust of parties, 
the utility discounting goes as follows. We assume that Y does not have the information about 
X’s time-preference or any other reputational data. 
 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑋) = ∑
𝑥𝑡
(1 + 𝑑)𝑡
4
𝑡=1
=
𝑥1
(1 + 𝑑)1
+
𝑥2
(1 + 𝑑)2
+
𝑥3
(1 + 𝑑)3
+
𝑥4
(1 + 𝑑)4
 
 
From the perspective of X, the utility stream gained from strategy A is therefore (-2, -
2, -2, -2) and strategy B (0, -3, -3, -3). Therefore, strategies A and B yield a discounted utility 
as follows: 
 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐴(𝑋) = ∑
𝑥𝑡
(1 + 𝑑)𝑡
4
𝑡=1
=
−2
(1 + 𝑑)1
+
−2
(1 + 𝑑)2
+
−2
(1 + 𝑑)3
+
−2
(1 + 𝑑)4
 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐵(𝑋) = ∑
𝑥𝑡
(1 + 𝑑)𝑡
4
𝑡=1
=
0
(1 + 𝑑)1
+
−3
(1 + 𝑑)2
+
−3
(1 + 𝑑)3
+
−3
(1 + 𝑑)4
 
  
If the time-preference of the individual X is, say d=0,15, the utility gained from the 
multi-period model goes as follows: 
Strategy A: - 5,71 and Strategy B: - 5,96 
  
When a temporal setting is applied, the individuals gain higher utility by co-operating. 
Suddenly the Nash equilibrium of the one period game does not apply as the utility maximizing 
strategy of the individual, even from the rational calculus based perspective. However, when 
the time-preference is higher, say d=0,25, the numbers turn other way around, deception is 
encouraged: 
Strategy A: - 4,72 and Strategy B: - 4,68 
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Based on the analysis of this simplistic and theoretical Framework A three implications 
should be noticed concerning the building of trust: 
1) The time-preference of the individuals can make a huge difference whether actors 
tend to trust each other or not. A higher time-preference is therefore associated with 
a less trusting behavior as demonstrated.  
2) The number of intervals in a trust relationship between the same actors, X and Y, is 
associated with even higher relative advantage for the trusting strategy (A) compared 
to taking advantage of the other actor’s misplaced trust in t=1 (B), regardless the 
individuals time-preference. (The longer the relationship is, the more beneficial it is 
to trust.) 
3) If the one, X or Y who deceives the another individual, manages to keep up the façade 
for a longer period, through cheating and information asymmetries, the benefits of 
the scam are the greater, the longer the play goes on. This observation explains, for 
example, the incentives of a Ponzi-scam – short terms huge profits at the expense of 
trust are the higher, the longer the scam goes on, as well the higher time-preference 
the cheater has.  
 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are formed: 
Hypothesis 11 (H11): “A higher time preference is associated with a lower amount of trusting 
behavior.” 
 
Hypothesis 12 (H12): “A longer commitment in a supply chain partnership is associated with 
a higher degree of trust.” 
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3.3 Hypotheses 
Based on the literature review and the Framework A built on it, several hypotheses have been 
formed and will be tested in the empirical part. These hypotheses are tested with an empirical 
study and analysis conducted as a questionnaire to the members of the association of logistics 
experts in Finland (Suomen Osto- ja Logistiikkayhdistys LOGY ry). Other contacts, which the 
respondent group consists of, was acquired from the database of the customer data company 
called Suomen Asiakastieto Oy and their lists of the logistics and purchasing experts of 
Finland. 
The hypotheses of this thesis are listed are as follows: 
1. Hypothesis 1 (H1): “Trust and the seamlessness of human collaboration are more 
important factors for the success in supply chains than the use of technology” 
2. Hypothesis 2 (H2): “The role of technology as a superior factor of supply chains is 
often exaggerated.” 
3. Hypothesis 3 (H3): “Trust can be seen as capital, i.e. ‘trust capital’.”  
4. Hypothesis 4 (H4): “Trust is the most important prerequisite for successful supply chain 
management.” 
5. Hypothesis 5 (H5): “Sharing information among supply chain partners increases the 
level of trust in the supply chain.” 
6. Hypothesis 6 (H6): “Finding the right ways of cooperation in supply chain that works, 
takes time and is an iterative process of trial and error by its nature.” 
7. Hypothesis 7 (H7): “Knowledge-based view on trust explains better the phenomenon 
of trust in supply chain context than calculus-based trust.” 
8. Hypothesis 8 (H8): “Collecting and exploiting tacit knowledge in the supply chain is 
one of the most important factors that enables a competitive advantage for the supply 
chain.” 
9. Hypothesis 9 (H9): “The production and using of tacit knowledge in the supply chain 
partnership is related with high level of trust in the supply chain collaboration.” 
10. Hypothesis 10 (H10): “Rebuilding trust is harder after it is considered to be lost once.”  
11. Hypothesis 11 (H11): “A higher time preference is associated with a lower amount of 
trusting behavior.” 
12. Hypothesis 12 (H12): “A longer commitment in a supply chain partnership is associated 
with a higher degree of trust.”  
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4 Empirical analysis 
The empirical part of this master’s thesis work consists of a questionnaire that collects relevant 
data to test out the hypotheses is built on the introduction section, literature review, and the 
theoretical framework. This questionnaire was sent to the logistics experts with the title of 
“Supply chain collaboration survey” (Supply chain collaboration tutkimus) through email (see 
section 4.2). 
 
4.1 Sampling pool 
The questionnaire of this thesis was delivered to the respondents in cooperation with the 
logistics expert’s Association of Finland (Logy ry.), through their monthly membership email 
letter. Additional contacts were collected to the sampling pool by using the database of a 
customer information company Suomen Asiakastieto, which has an extensive database of 
logistics experts as well as purchasing managers of Finnish enterprises of all sizes. This service 
was used due to the low amount of responses received from Logy ry membership email list.  
The sampling pool of Logy ry consisted of a total of approximately 4 000 logistics 
experts all around Finland. An additional 6117 contacts were included in the pool from the 
database of Suomen Asiakastieto Oy. Their large contact database was narrowed with a contact 
tool, which the company offers to its customers. All-size Finnish companies were included in 
the sampling pool. The targeted people were the experts responsible for logistics operations or 
purchasing in the individual companies. 
As a result, only five responses were obtained from the Logy ry pool resulting only in 
a little over 0,1% respondent rate. The reason might be that many people are ignorant about 
monthly membership emails. The questionnaire was located in the latter part of the letter so 
that this might have decreased the respondent rate as well. However, the respondent rate from 
the database of Suomen Asiakastieto delivered more results for this study. Out of 6117 contacts 
delivered by Asiakastieto, 215 (3,5%) answers were received. The total amount of well over 
200 replies in this questionnaire is supposed to enable this study to get statistically significant 
results (Suh & Kwon 2006). All in all, a total of n=220 answer were received. 
The questionnaire form conducted with Google Form (Appendix A) was sent through 
email to the experts of the companies. They were motivated by a movie ticket lottery and that 
they would eventually gain too access to the summary of results of the data collected via this 
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form. In the case of Asiakastieto’s contacts, the request to answer this questionnaire was sent 
by email through the thesis author’s Aalto University student email and contacts were added 
to ‘BBC:’ -field of the email. This practice resulted that some of the respondent company email 
systems could have automatically categorized this email request as a spam mail. Some mail 
delivery systems informed straightly if they had blocked the mail. Some of the email addresses 
were old, in the sense that they were not functioning anymore. A few respondents might have 
also missed the request email due to sick leave, holiday, etc. Some of those replied with 
automatic email responses.  
 
4.1.1 The respondent data 
The interviewees (n=220) were asked more specific questions about their supply chain 
partnership in section B where they provided background information about their supply chain 
partnership. Out of these business partnerships, 83,2% (183) were still ongoing, while 16,8% 
(37) supply chain partnerships had ended from the viewpoint of the respondent. 
 
 
Figure 16: Status of the relationship from the viewpoint of the individual respondent (n=220). 
 
4.1.2 The sizes of the respondent companies and their partners  
In these supply chain partnerships, the respondent’s companies varied a lot by size. A total of 
eight respondents (8) were not willing to reveal the size of their company while three (3) 
answers were not given. This part of the questionnaire was optional to answer due to some 
businesses having privacy concerns about their strategic alliances. Therefore, a total of 209 
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answers (95,0%) were given where the respondents’ firm size in terms of turnover was possible 
to determine. 
They were distributed as follows: 
 
Table 7: The size distribution of the respondant’s firms, n=209. 
 
Category 
 
Turnover / year (€) 
 
# of respondents 
 
Percentage 
 
Micro-companies 
 
0 - 2 million 
 
29 
 
13,9 % 
 
Small companies 
 
2 - 10 million 
 
76 
 
36,4 % 
 
Middle-size companies 
 
10 - 50 million 
 
51 
 
24,4 % 
 
Large companies 
 
50 – 500 million 
 
41 
 
19,6 % 
 
Very large companies 
 
Over 500 million 
 
12 
 
5,7 % 
 
  
The companies, which the respondents collaborated with, were on average bigger in 
size than the respondent companies themselves. Most likely due to privacy reasons three left 
unanswered to this section and 25 respondents were not willing to specify the turnover 
category of their partner. However, 192 answers about the supply chain respondent’s partner 
company were acquired, and they distributed as follows: 
 
Table 8: The size distribution of the selected SC partner companies, n=192. 
 
Category 
 
Turnover / year (€) 
 
# of respondents 
 
Percentage 
 
Micro-companies 
 
0 - 2 million 
 
22 
 
11,5 % 
 
Small companies 
 
2 - 10 million 
 
49 
 
25,5 % 
 
Middle-size companies 
 
10 - 50 million 
 
54 
 
28,1 % 
 
Large companies 
 
50 – 500 million 
 
46 
 
24,0 % 
 
Very large companies 
 
Over 500 million 
 
21 
 
10,9 % 
 
4.1.3 Internationality 
As the questionnaire was written in Finnish and sent to the representatives of Finnish 
companies, it was suspected that most of these companies work in the Finnish markets with 
their supply chain partner, but the study shows not all of them. A total of 220 answers were 
collected through this section, meaning every respondent provided the detail of markets where 
the supply chain companionship in section B happened, though they had the option not to 
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answer this part. The respondent could choose multiple options. The distribution goes as 
follows: 
Table 9: The geographical summary of the markets where the respondent and partner firms operate / operated 
as the respondent described, n=220. 
 
Market area 
# of 
respondents 
Percentage 
Finland 196 89,1 % 
Other Nordics 51 23,2 % 
Western and Central 
Europe 
51 23,2 % 
Eastern Europe 28 12,7 % 
Southern Europe 21 9,5 % 
Africa 4 1,8 % 
Middle East 7 3,2 % 
Russia 12 5,5 % 
North America 11 5,0 % 
Central and South 
America 
4 1,8 % 
Australia and 
Oceania 
7 3,2 % 
Japan 4 1,8 % 
Far East (China, 
India etc.) 
18 8,2 % 
 
 
4.1.4 Industries of respondent companies and their partners 
Additionally, to the internationality status of the companionship and the sizes of the companies, 
the industries of the cooperating companies were also asked from the respondents. The 
survey form used the official Standard Industrial Classification 2008 of the Finnish authorities 
(TOL2008; Toimialaluokitus 2008). The data collected shows nearly half of the respondent 
companies chose to describe their partnership with a logistics company as 43,9% of the 
interviewees described their companionship with a firm working in the industry H – 
Transportation and storage according to the TOL 2008 classification. The biggest single group 
of the respondents (40,0 %) were operating in the C – Manufacturing industry. The answers to 
the background question of industries are listed below: 
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Respondent 
n=195 
% 
Partner 
n=180 
% 
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing (01-03) 5 2,6 % 2 1,1 % 
B Mining and quarrying (05-09) 1 0,5 % 1 0,6 % 
C Manufacturing (10-33) 78 40,0 % 48 26,7 % 
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (34-35) 
1 0,5 % 5 2,8 % 
E Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation 
activities (36-39) 
6 3,1 % 4 2,2 % 
F Construction (41-43) 16 8,2 % 12 6,7 % 
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles (45-47) 
32 16,4 % 15 8,3 % 
H Transportation and storage (49-53) 37 19,0 % 79 43,9 % 
I Accommodation and food service activities (55-56) 2 1,0 % 2 1,1 % 
J Information and communication (58-63) 2 1,0 % 2 1,1 % 
K Financial and insurance activities (64-66) 1 0,5 % 0 0,0 % 
L Real estate activities (67-68) 2 1,0 % 0 0,0 % 
M Professional, scientific and technical activities (69-75) 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 % 
N Administrative and support service activities (77-82) 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 % 
O Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
(83-84) 
0 0,0 % 0 0,0 % 
P Education (85) 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 % 
Q Human health and social work activities (86-88) 2 1,0 % 4 2,2 % 
R Arts, entertainment and recreation (90-93) 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 % 
S Other service activities (94-96) 6 3,1 % 2 1,1 % 
T Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- 
and services-producing activities of households for own use (97-
98) 
0 0,0 % 0 0,0 % 
U Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies (99) 1 0,5 % 0 0,0 % 
X Industry unknown 0 3 1,5 % 3 1,7 % 
 
Table 10: The industries of respondents and their partners according to TOL2008. 
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4.2 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire (Appendix A), which was sent to the logistics experts all around Finland, 
consists of two sections, A and B. The first part, A, represents eight propositions about supply 
chains (or supply chain management) in general. One additional question was asked where the 
respondent ranked certain aspects (8 items), based on how important they are for “a successful 
supply chain management.” 
The answer to the first 8 general questions was given with a 7-option Likert-scale where 
the respondent could choose whether he or she totally agrees or disagrees with the proposition, 
or whether the opinion is somewhere in between of these two extremes. The one additional 
question asks the respondent to rank eight items (from the most important to the least 
important) based on their importance for successful SCM. 
 Section B focuses on representing 16 propositions of a specific supply chain 
companionship with a certain firm which the respondents are asked to recall to his mind. 
In this way it is meaningful to study which aspects of supply chain collaboration explains the 
existence or emergence of trust the most. The answers of section B were also collected with a 
7-option Likert-scale, except question number one, which is about trust in supply chains. In 
this question, a nine-option (9) scale was used as it can capture more detailed nuances of the 
answer compared to 7-option scale, as the priority of this study is to study especially trust. Suh 
and Kwon (2006) uses a similar model. This setting is ideal for performing an OLS regression 
analysis to study whether certain traits of supply chain collaboration have statistically 
significant effect on the variable (trust), that is wanted to be explained by this thesis (A similar 
to the model of Suh & Kwon 2006).  
It should be noted that there is some debate whether using Likert-scale with linear 
regression is appropriate (Jamieson 2004). However, according to an extensive study by Carifio 
& Perla (2007), it is a myth that only non-parametric statistical tests should be applied to Likert 
scales as the response formats are interval scales. A seven-item Likert-scale is thus interpreted 
here to be ‘continuous enough’ to meet the criteria for conducting an OLS regression (Grace-
Martin 2008). 
All propositions of the questionnaire were compulsory to the respondents to answer and 
therefore all propositions in section A and B have the same respondent number of n=220 
(contrary to the background information section). 
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4.2.1 Testing, redesigning and feedback of the survey form 
The functioning of the questionnaire form and the understandability of the questions were 
tested before the launch of the inquiry with some logistics experts as well as with some non-
academic people to make sure the forms are understandable. They gave some initial dummy 
answers to ensure the functioning of the form and the database system (Google Drive), which 
records the entries. These test entries were later deleted from the answer database. 
In the testing phase, some questions were redesigned, and the layout was altered a bit 
to make the answering easier and unambiguous for the respondent. Through testing, feedback, 
and little altering, the survey was considered good enough by the author and the supervisor of 
this thesis to be sent to the respondents. Some control variable questions were also added to 
the questionnaire, section B. 
 
4.2.2 List of Propositions 
As the questionnaire consists of two sections A and B, the propositions are named after their 
sections A or B. The part A is about supply chain management in general, while the section B 
studies a certain and specific supply chain partnership, which the respondent is asked to recall 
to his or her mind. The corresponding hypotheses of each proposition are in parenthesis. 
4.2.2.1 Section A 
A1. Well-defined contracts and incentive systems are more important than building deep trust 
in supply chains (H7). 
A2. Trust and the seamlessness of human collaboration are more important factors for the 
success in supply chains than the use of technology. (H1) 
A3. It is essential to get benefits straight away in an early stage in a supply chain collaboration 
(H11). 
A4. Trust with supply chain partner that will lead to cost benefits develops rather slowly than 
quickly. (H3 & H12) 
A5. Rebuilding trust is harder after it is considered to be lost once. (H3, H7 & H10) 
A6. Collecting and exploiting tacit knowledge in the supply chain is one of the most important 
factors that enables a competitive advantage for the supply chain. (H8) 
A7. The role of technology as a superior factor of supply chains is often exaggerated. (H2) 
A8. Finding the right ways of cooperation in supply chains that works, takes time and is an 
iterative process of trial and error by its nature. (H6 & H3) 
 Empirical analysis 
 
 64  
 
A9. Rank the following items based on their importance in successful supply chain 
management: (from most important to least important) 
9.1. The use of newest technology in supply chain 
9.2. Trustfulness of the supply chain partners (H4) 
9.3. Commitment of the supply chain partners 
9.4. Well defined contracting with the supply chain partners 
9.5. Effective sharing of knowledge in the supply chain 
9.6. Good reputation of the partners in supply chain 
9.7. Predictability and low-riskiness of the partners in supply chain 
9.8. Performance and flexibility of the partners in supply chain 
4.2.2.2 Section B 
B1. The level of trust was excellent in the supply chain partnership that I recalled. 
B2. Information sharing was deep and extensive in this partnership. (H5) 
B3. In this partnership that I recalled the use of newest technologies in corporate planning 
systems was extensive. 
B4. The partnership that I recalled has lasted for a long time already. (H3, H7 & H12) 
B5. The partner that I recalled has or had good reputation in the markets. (H3) 
B6. Our supply chain was/is able to exploit the tacit knowledge that in the chain. (H7 & H9) 
B7. In the partnership that I recalled, contracting framework is clear and extensive for example 
in terms of risk management. (H7, negative relationship) 
B8. We have made a lot of assets specific investments in our partner company. 
B9. The partner company has made a lot of asset specific investments in our company. (H7, 
negative) 
B10. The partnership I recalled worked very efficiently and seamlessly. 
B11. This supply chain partnership benefited/benefits our company very much. 
B12. This supply chain partnership benefited/benefits the partner’s company very much. 
B13. We are focusing more on short-term gains rather than long-term benefits in this 
companionship. (H11) 
B14. The integration between companies in this supply chain I recalled was very deep. 
B15. We are/were ready be sacrifice our own interest and being flexible for the partner 
company. 
B16. The partner company was ready to sacrifice and being flexible for the interests of our 
company. 
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4.3 Results 
The results for the hypotheses and the propositions corresponding to them are listed below in 
this section 4.3. This section goes first through the Hypotheses related to section A and then 
the model built on answers of section B is established in section 4.4. 
 
4.3.1 Hypothesis 1 – Technology vs. trust 
Proposition 2 (A2) in section A studies the hypothesis 1 (H1). The hypothesis suggests: “Trust 
and the seamlessness of human collaboration are more important factors for the success in 
supply chains than the use of technology”. This hypothesis was tested through a Likert-scale 
proposition where the respondent answers whether they totally agree or disagree with this 
proposition or whether their views are somewhere in between the extremes. 
Allen and Seaman (2007) argues that “mean and standard deviations are in general 
invalid parameters for descriptive statistics”. A better way to study descriptive statistics are 
“tabulations, frequencies, contingency tables and chi-square tests”. 
 Therefore, the propositions are studied as polling survey data, and the margin of error 
is used as the method to determine whether the propositions get statistical support or not. The 
hypotheses are interpreted to be strongly supported if over half of the respondents agree more 
than disagree with the proposition, even when we take account the lower end of the margin of 
error. The answers for A2 related to the first hypothesis (H1) are distributed as follows (n=220): 
 
Table 11: Answer distribution to the proposition 2 (A2). 
 
totally disagree in between   totally agree  
SCALE ->    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ANSWERS -> 
0 11 34 33 58 66 18 
% 
0,0 % 5,0 % 15,5 % 15,0 % 26,4 % 30,0 % 8,2 % 
 
Disagree more than agree Between Agree more than disagree 
 
20,5 % 15,0 % 64,5 % 
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The margin of error for surveys are calculated through the following formula for a 
confidence level of 95% (VirtuaaliAMK-verkosto): 
 
±1.96 ∗ √
𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝑝)
𝑛
 
 
The variable ‘p’ refers to the observed amount of answers, i.e., ‘sample probability’ 
and ‘n’ to the amount of total responses given). Therefore, we can estimate with a 95% 
confidence level, the right percentage that agrees with the A2 (supporting H1) is between 
64,5% ± 6,3%. The null hypothesis that ‘under half of the population agrees with A2 more than 
disagrees’ is rejected. Therefore, the Hypothesis 1 (H1) is supported as over half of the 
population agrees more than disagrees or is neutral with the proposition 2 with a confidence 
level of over 95%: 
H1: “Trust and the seamlessness of human collaboration are more important factors for the 
success in supply chains than the use of technology.”  is strongly supported. 
 
4.3.2 Hypothesis 2 – Technology as an exaggerated factor 
The Hypothesis 2 (H2) goes as follows: “The role of technology as a superior factor of 
supply chains is often exaggerated.” This was also studied in section A of the questionnaire 
with the same methodology, by asking the respondents to answer whether they totally agree 
or disagree with the proposition or are in-between. This hypothesis was tested through 
Proposition 7 (A7) and analyzed by similar methodology as with the Hypothesis 1. 
 
 Empirical analysis 
 
 67  
 
 The distribution of answers to A7 goes as follows: 
 
totally disagree in between   totally agree  
SCALE ->    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ANSWERS ->  
3 23 46 37 46 51 14 
% 
1,4 % 10,5 % 20,9 % 16,8 % 20,9 % 23,2 % 6,4 % 
 
Disagree more than agree Between Agree more than disagree 
 
32,7 % 16,8 % 50,5 % 
  
Table 12: Distribution of answers to Proposition 7 (A7). 
 
With a 95% confidence level the A7(agree) is 50,5% ± 6,6%. Therefore, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that under half of the population with a 95% confidence level 
agrees more than disagree or are in between with the proposition. However, we can gain a 
moderate amount of support for the Hypothesis 2 as we can reject another (weaker) null 
hypothesis with a high confidence level, which goes as follows: “equal amount or less 
amount of population agrees more than disagrees with the proposition 7.” 
Therefore, we can conclude that the proposition 7 (A7) and thus Hypothesis 2 (H2) is 
moderately supported as the population agrees more than disagrees with it with a high 
confidence level. The distribution of answers is clearly statistically distributed towards the 
side of “agree more than disagree” and over 83% of the respondents had and opinion of the 
matter other than “in between” (4 on the Likert-scale).  H2 is not however supported as 
clearly as the H1. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): “The role of technology as a superior factor of supply chains is often 
exaggerated.” is moderately supported. 
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4.3.3 Hypothesis 4 – Trust as the most important SCM success-factor 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) goes as follows: “Trust is the most important prerequisite for successful 
supply chain management.” The hypothesis was tested in the last question (A9) of section A, 
where the respondent ranked eight different items in the order of their importance on successful 
supply chain management. These items were selected for the questionnaire based on the 
literature review in Section 2 of this thesis: 
1. The use of newest technology in supply chain 
2. Trustfulness of the supply chain partners 
3. Commitment of the supply chain partners 
4. Well defined contracting with the supply chain partners 
5. Effective sharing of knowledge in the supply chain 
6. Good reputation of the partners in supply chain 
7. Predictability and low-riskiness of the partners in supply chain 
8. Performance and flexibility of the partners in supply chain 
The hypothesis is tested through a statistical test whether the hypothesis is supported or 
not. The methodology of this section was again a survey where Hypothesis 4 was tested 
whether it gains support or not with a significance level of 95% (See Table 13). 
The item 2, “trust”, gained the most popularity with a total of 43,2% (95 respondents) of 
the interviewees mentioning it to be the most important factor for successful supply chain 
management. The margin of error is therefore with a n=220, ± 6,5%. As the second most 
important item; “commitment” gained a total of 23,6% (58 respondents) it is safe to say trust 
is the most important item for successful supply chain management with a confidence of over 
95%. 
It should also be noted that as commitment is the second most important item, it is highly 
related to trust according to the literature review and various theories of trust. Therefore, as 
commitment was ranked so high, it can be interpreted to support the hypothesis as trust and 
commitment are highly related to each other.  
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The distribution of answers was the following: 
ITEM 
(n=220) 
Most 
important 
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Least 
important 
Technology 5.5% 3.6% 8.6% 5.0% 10.9% 12.7% 15.0% 38.6% 
Trust 43.2% 24.5% 11.8% 6.8% 4.5% 2.3% 4.1% 2.7% 
Commitment 23.6% 30.9% 19.5% 9.5% 5.9% 4.5% 3.6% 2.3% 
Contracting 5.5% 6.4% 14.5% 19.1% 13.6 15.5 17.7% 7.7% 
Sharing of 
knowledge 
5.9% 9.1% 18.6% 20.9% 15.9% 18.6% 8.6% 2.3% 
Reputation 0.9% 4.5% 4.1% 8.2% 16.8% 19.5% 17.7% 28.2% 
Predictability 
& Low risk 
3.2% 5.0% 10.0% 13.2% 15.0% 17.3% 25.0% 11.4% 
Performance 
& Flexibility 
12.3% 15.9% 12.7% 16.8% 16.8% 9.5% 8.2% 6.8% 
Table 13: Most important factors in succesful SCM (A9), n=220. 
 
Therefore, the Hypothesis 4 (H4): “Trust is the most important prerequisite for successful 
supply chain management.” is supported. 
 
4.3.4 Hypothesis 6 – Trust as an iterative process 
The Hypothesis 6 (H6) states that: “Finding the right ways of cooperation in supply chain that 
works, takes time and is an iterative process of trial and error by its nature.” This hypothesis 
was studied in the questionnaire section A with the proposition 8 (A8).  
The proposition studies whether trust and the ways of cooperation in supply chains are 
built in an iterative way, which takes time, or whether right ways can be determined through 
planning and deductive reasoning. 
The answer to this question reflects indirectly whether an evolutionary approach has 
more explanatory power than a theory based on contracting and planning. This proposition also 
tests whether efficient supply chain management is about collective learning, which takes time, 
or not. 
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The distribution of answers in A8 was the following: 
 
totally disagree in between   totally agree  
SCALE ->    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ANSWERS->  
2 17 29 32 71 58 11 
% 
0,9 % 7,7 % 13,2 % 14,5 % 32,3 % 26,4 % 5,0 % 
 
Disagree more than agree Between Agree more than disagree 
 
21,8 % 14,5 % 63,7 % 
  
Table 14: Distribution of answers to Proposition 8 (A8). 
  
Applying the margin of error method similar than when studying the Hypothesis 1 (H1), 
it is relatively easy to determine whether the H6 is supported. The margin of error with 220 
respondents is ± 6,4 % with a confidence level of 95%. Therefore, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that less than half of the population agrees more than disagrees with the proposition 
8. 
Therefore, the Hypothesis 6 (H6): “Finding the right ways of cooperation in supply chain that 
works, takes time and is an iterative process of trial and error by its nature.” is strongly 
supported. 
 
4.3.5 Hypothesis 8 – Tacit knowledge and competitive advantage 
Hypothesis 8 (H8) studies the role of tacit knowledge as a key factor explaining the 
competitiveness and performance of supply chains. This was studies with Proposition 6 (A6) 
in section A in the study as it was highly related to the research questions of this master’s thesis. 
 
The distribution of A6 was the following: 
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totally disagree in between   totally agree  
SCALE ->    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ANSWERS ->  
0 15 14 25 68 78 20 
% 
0,0 % 6,8 % 6,4 % 11,4 % 30,9 % 35,5 % 9,1 % 
 
Disagree more than agree Between Agree more than disagree 
 
13,2 % 11,4 % 75,5 % 
  
Table 15: Distribution of answers to Proposition 6 (A6). 
  
Given that, over 75,5 % agrees more than disagrees with the proposition, it should be 
studied whether this majority statistically is significant with the margin of error method. With 
220 interviewees the margin of error is ± 5,7%. In this case, we might also reject the null 
hypothesis that less than half of the respondents agrees more than disagrees with the A6. 
Therefore, the Hypothesis 8 (H8): “Collecting and exploiting tacit knowledge in the supply 
chain is one of the most important factors that enables a competitive advantage for the supply 
chain” is strongly supported. 
 
4.3.6 Hypothesis 10 – Rebuilding trust which has been once lost 
The 10th Hypothesis of this study (H10) studies the claim whether ‘trust which is once lost is 
hard to rebuild’. This deals with the theoretical framework and model of this thesis, and thus 
this fact needs to be verified. The Proposition 5 (A5) studies this hypothesis. 
 The support for this hypothesis reveal the nature of trust and especially how it is built 
in a temporal dimension. As trust is considered to be iterative and likely knowledge-based, the 
role and mechanics of distrust are important. The answer to this question also reveals whether 
the concept of reciprocity norm receives empirical support or not. 
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The distribution for A5 was the following: 
 
totally disagree in between   totally agree  
SCALE ->    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ANSWERS ->  
2 2 9 7 39 84 77 
% 
0,9 % 0,9 % 4,1 % 3,2 % 17,7 % 38,2 % 35,0 % 
 
Disagree more than agree Between Agree more than disagree 
 
5,9 % 3,2 % 90,9 % 
  
Table 16: Distribution of answers to Proposition 5 (A5). 
 
 
As we clearly notice, an overwhelming majority agrees more than disagrees with this 
proposition and thus the existence of reciprocity norm gains more support. More than 9 out of 
10 agrees to some degree with Proposition 5 (A5). Therefore, with a confidence level of 95%, 
more people agree than disagree in the population with the proposition 90,9% ± 3,8%. 
Rejecting the null hypothesis is safe. 
Therefore, the Hypothesis 10 (H10): “Rebuilding trust is harder after it is considered to 
be lost once.” is strongly supported. 
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4.4 Multiple regression model of trust factors 
The rest of the hypotheses was studied with the same statistical model acquired through the 
data of section B (and some of the related hypotheses supported with propositions of section 
A). In this section, the respondents were asked on a Likert-scale from 1 to 7 to answer to certain 
propositions when it comes to supply chain collaboration in a particular partnership. These 
variables were designed to give an answer on what factors explain trust in supply chains. The 
statistical significance of certain factors in trust-buildings was studied through a statistical path 
analysis conducted with the statistics computer software Stata. 
 The method, which was chosen, consisted of multiple regression analysis with path 
modeling for determining which variables explains best the phenomenon of trust in supply 
chains. The variables were selected to the model on the basis of the literature review and the 
theoretical framework. 
Also, variables from the study of Suh and Kwon (2005 & 2006) was introduced as the 
Hypothesis 7 (H7) studies whether their calculus-based theory of trust gains more support than 
the knowledge-based model, which this thesis has been covering in the literature review 
section. The OLS model of this study is also similar to their model. 
 
4.4.1 The model 
At the initial stage, multiple linear regression models were tested to determine which variables 
had the most explanatory power when studying the level of trust in Supply Chains (Table 18). 
The multicollinearity of the variables was investigated through a variance inflation factor (VIF) 
analysis. As all variables had a VIF below 5, according to O’Brien (2007), the multicollinearity 
is not indicated. (Pan & Jackson 2008, uses 4 as their maximum allowed VIF value.) In this 
regression, the highest VIF-value is 2,83 between Trust (B1) and Partnership Efficiency and 
Seamlessness (B10).  
The correlations of the variables are tabulated beneath in Table 17. The data demonstrates 
that while some correlations between variables are high, they still do not exceed a correlation 
above 0,9, which is considered to be an indicator of possible multicollinearity problem, 
according to KvantiMOTV guide to statistics by University of Tampere (2003). No 
multicollinearity issue was therefore detected. 
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Table 17: Correlation tabulation of Questionnaire, Section B. 
Correlation tabulation of 
Questionnaire B 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
B1. Trust 1                
B2. Information sharing 0,76 1               
B3. Newest technology 0,27 0,24 1              
B4. Long duration of partnership 0,4 0,4 0,19 1             
B5. Partner's reputation 0,44 0,39 0,32 0,58 1            
B6. Efficient Use of Tacit Knowledge 0,48 0,49 0,17 0,33 0,31 1           
B7. Well defined contracting & Risk 
management 0,39 0,36 0,37 0,22 0,34 0,35 1          
B8. Asset specific investments made by 
focal company 0,09 0,12 0,12 0,08 0 0,14 0,19 1         
B9 Asset specific investments made by 
partner company 0,22 0,23 0,07 0,06 −0,01 0,28 0,16 0,5 1        
B10. Partnership was Efficient and 
Seamless 0,7 0,67 0,23 0,51 0,43 0,47 0,36 0,1 0,27 1       
B11. Partnership benefited the Focal 
company 0,55 0,51 0,23 0,5 0,51 0,44 0,4 0,25 0,28 0,64 1      
B12. Partnership benefited the Partner 
company 0,38 0,4 0,09 0,4 0,35 0,32 0,35 0,29 0,33 0,47 0,57 1     
B13. Short-term vs. Long-term focus −0,07 −0,07 −0,04 −0,1 −0,11 −0,06 −0,07 −0,03 −0,07 −0,01 −0,09 −0,1 1    
B14. Integration of processes between 
focal company and Partner 0,32 0,35 0,45 0,2 0,21 0,28 0,33 0,12 0,2 0,36 0,33 0,3 −0,14 1   
B15. Flexibility and commitment of 
Focal company 0,32 0,29 0,07 0,15 0,17 0,26 0,19 0,19 0,23 0,32 0,39 0,34 −0,08 0,33 1  
B16. Flexibility and commitment of 
Partner company 0,46 0,49 0,02 0,31 0,24 0,36 0,17 0,17 0,32 0,57 0,51 0,41 −0,05 0,24 0,53 1 
 
The initial results suggested that there is a total of three different variables that have a 
statistically significant impact on the level of trust in supply chains when omitted variables 
were ruled out by various linear regression models with a total of 15 different variables. These 
variables were: Information sharing (B2), Partner’s reputation (B5) and Partnership Efficiency 
and Seamlessness (B10), (Figure 17 & Table 18). 
In turn, the variables which explained Information sharing were especially Efficient use of 
Tacit Knowledge (B6) and Flexibility and Commitment by the Partner company (B16). 
Partnership Efficiency and Seamlessness of Partnership (B10) was explained best by the 
variables Flexibility and Commitment (B16), Time in Partnership (B4) and Benefit for the 
respondent’s company from the partnership (B11). Partner’s reputation (B5) was, in turn, 
explained statistically best by the variables Use of Newest Technology (B3), Benefit for the 
respondent’s company (B11) and Long time in Partnership (B4) (Figure 17).  
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Figure 17: The statistical model, n=220. 
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Table 18: Testing different models of trust for explanatory factors & possible omitted-variable bias. 
N=220 Trust 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Adjusted R-squared 0,195 0,322 0,336 0,360 0,590 0,598 
B4 - Length of the partnership  0,195* 0,344*** 0,194* 0,137* 0,0552 
B6 - Use of tacit knowledge as a competitive 
advantage  0,442*** 0,348*** 0,322*** 0,116+ 0,0107 
B7 - Clear and widely defined contracting 0,378***  0,239** 0,185* 0,131* 0,103+ 
B8 - Asset specific investments by focal 
company −0,0824  −0,0802 −0,068 −0,0527 −0,0462 
B9 - Asset specific investments by partner 
company 0,183*  0,119 0,138+ 0,0491 0,0623 
B13 - Short-term vs. long-term focus  −0,00851 0,00867 0,0178 0,00403 0,00946 
B14 - Integration of processes between the 
companies 0,235**  0,141+ 0,133+ 0,0189 0,0173 
B2 - Information sharing     0,788*** 0,767*** 
B5 - Reputation of the partner  0,438***  0,367**  0,213* 
       
 + p < 0,1 ** p < 0,01   
 * p < 0,05 *** p < 0,001   
 
 
As Table 18 suggests, there are plenty of omitted variables that explain trust. This is 
not unexpected: it seems logical that the length of partnership and reputation explain each other 
and correlate – this suggests that they are interrelated. Another finding is that the variables of 
calculus-based trust mostly fail to explain trust when they are together in the same model 
with the knowledge-based variables (Models 3 & 4). Model 1 describes the factors related 
to the calculus-based trust theory; Model 2 outlines the variables of knowledge-based theory. 
The Models 3 and 4 includes both of them – in this scenario the explanatory power of the 
calculus-based variables collapse. 
In the final model (Model 6), more variables are included in the model. In this case, 
only Information sharing and Reputation have still statistical significance. Therefore, they are 
the most important factors explaining trust. The omitted variables are then studied in the way 
how well they explain the most significant explanatory variables of trust. This is how the final 
model (Figure 17) is formed, though modified a bit by adding the variable B10 to get a higher 
adjusted r-squared value. 
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The results of this model correspond to the theoretical Framework A by the author 
(section 3.2, Figure 13) in the theoretical section. Reputation, the perceived benefits, and 
satisfaction of collaboration are related to each other (Efficiency and seamlessness) and explain 
trust. 
 
4.4.2 Hypothesis 3 & 7 – Trust as capital & Knowledge-based trust vs. calculus-based 
Hypothesis 3 deals with the question whether trust can be seen as a capital or not. This 
hypothesis can be studied and approached with several items of the empirical analysis. First of 
all, reputation explaining trust, which is built upon a temporal interval from the basis of 
reciprocity, can be seen to support this hypothesis. The regression model suggests Partner’s 
reputation (B5) (a form of trust capital) is associated statistically with the trust in supply chain 
collaboration with the coefficient of 0,18 and with a p-value lower than 0,05. 
In addition to this, and more importantly the parameter Long-time in supply chain 
collaboration (B4) explains both the level of reputation of the partner AND whether the 
relationship is considered to be Efficient and Seamless (B10), i.e. how it is deemed to satisfy 
the respondent company. This empirical finding supports moderately the hypothesis 3 (H3) 
and is in contrary to the evidence of Suh & Kwon’s study (2006). The support to proposition 
A5 (Hypothesis 10) and A8 support also the notion that trust can be seen as a form of capital. 
As the theory suggests that knowledge-based trust is highly related to the theory of trust 
capital, Hypothesis 7 (H7) is studied also in this section as all the findings in this section can 
also be explained to support the knowledge-based trust theory. The calculus-based theory, 
which Suh & Kwon (2006) supports in SCM context, does not find a relationship with time in 
partnership and trust as this study finds. This is the first important piece of evidence for H7. 
In addition to the model (Figure 17), in section A proposition 4 and 8 (A4 & A8) studies 
whether trust develops quickly or by time. Both of the proposition are agreed by over 50% of 
the population with a confidence level of over 95%. Therefore, we can clearly show that trust 
is built in a long temporal context iteratively – rather than created by contracts and acquired of 
those measures the calculus-based theory on trust suggests (e.g. asset specific investments). 
Moreover, the regression model was tested with including the parameters Assets 
specific investments (B8 & B9) and Clear contracting framework (B7). The calculus-based 
theory suggests that these elements would have a significant explanatory power in terms of 
trust. However, this relationship was never discovered, even remotely (Figure 17 & Table 18).  
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This fact supports especially the Hypothesis 7, that the knowledge-based theory 
explains better trust than the calculus-based theory. The role of tacit knowledge as an indirect 
building block of trust supports H7 as well, as we have demonstrated earlier that knowledge-
based view of trust is highly associated with the use of tacit knowledge. This hypothesis (H7) 
is supported, whereas the previous Hypothesis 3 is supported only moderately, supposedly due 
to imperfect questionnaire design from the perspective the of H3. 
 
4.4.3 Hypothesis 5 – Information sharing and trust 
The statistical path regression model explains many of the traits, which were described in the 
literature review and the theoretical framework. The efficient sharing of information (B2) 
explains with a great significance the forming of trust, as the parameter coefficient is 0,63 
and the p-value is less than 0,001. This can be seen as strong support for the Hypothesis 5 
(H5), which suggests a strong explanatory role of Information sharing (B2) to the variable 
Trust (B1). In this path regression model, Information Sharing is the most significant 
explanatory variable for trust. The Hypothesis 5 (H5) “Sharing information among supply 
chain partners increases the level of trust in the supply chain.” is strongly supported. 
 
4.4.4 Hypothesis 9 – Tacit knowledge and trust 
Hypothesis 9 (H9) states that tacit knowledge is related to the level of trust in supply chain 
context. As the OLS path model (Figure 17) demonstrates, the use and exploitation of tacit 
knowledge explain the phenomenon of trust partially: it explains statistically significantly the 
deepness and extensiveness of information sharing in the supply chain which in turn explains 
trust significantly. Therefore, we can argue that Hypothesis 9 (H9) is (at least) partially 
supported as it explains the trust indirectly in a supply chain context according to the model 
(p>0,001). 
 
4.4.5 Hypothesis 11 – Time-preference and trust 
Hypothesis 11 (H11) is the only hypothesis which lacks a good degree of support as the models 
for trust does not get any significant coefficients nor p-values for the variable Short-term vs. 
long-term focus (B13) in explaining trust. There aren’t found any direct nor indirect paths for 
this. The hypothesis would have got supported if a clear and statistically negative relationship 
had been discovered with this parameter and Trust (B1). It is assumed this factor, time 
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preference, in reality, explains to some degree the trust in supply chain context but the question 
might not have got interpreted perfectly by the respondents and expressed clearly enough by 
the writer of the thesis. The theoretical framework would suggest a clear a priori relationship 
between time-preference and level of trust and it is believed to be there. This theme, 
relationship between trust and time-preference of individuals, should be studied therefore 
more. However, the Hypothesis 11 (H11) is not supported by the empirical data. 
 
4.4.6 Hypothesis 12 – Length of the relationship and trust 
Hypothesis 12 (H12) is supported moderately as the duration of the supply chain (B4) 
companionship explains trust in the supply chain context in two indirect ways: length in supply 
chain increases statistically significantly the perceived seamlessness (B10) and efficiency in a 
supply chain AND the reputation of the partner (B5). These factors, in turn, explains well the 
existence of trust (B1) in a supply chain. The hypothesis is therefore supported moderately as 
the length of partnership clearly explain (indirectly) the level of trust in a supply chain 
collaboration according to the path model (Figure 16). 
 
4.5 Summary of hypotheses 
# Hypothesis Supported? 
 
H1 
Trust and the seamlessness of human collaboration are more important factors for 
the success in supply chains than the use of technology 
 
Strongly 
H2 The role of technology as a superior factor of supply chains is often exaggerated. Moderately 
H3 Trust can be seen as capital, i.e. ‘trust capital’. Moderately 
H4 Trust is the most important prerequisite for successful supply chain management. Supported 
 
H5 
Sharing information among supply chain partners increases the level of trust in 
the supply chain 
 
Strongly 
 
H6 
Finding the right ways of cooperation in supply chain that works, takes time and 
is an iterative process of trial and error by its nature. 
 
Strongly 
 
H7 
Knowledge-based view on trust explains better the phenomenon of trust in supply 
chain context than calculus-based trust. 
 
Supported 
 
H8 
Collecting and exploiting tacit knowledge in the supply chain is one of the most 
important factors that enables a competitive advantage for the supply chain. 
 
Strongly 
 
H9 
The production and using of tacit knowledge in the supply chain partnership is 
related with high level of trust in the supply chain collaboration. 
 
Partially 
H10 Rebuilding trust is harder after it is considered to be lost once. Strongly 
H11 A higher time preference is associated with a lower amount of trusting behavior. Not 
 
H12 
A longer commitment in a supply chain partnership is associated with a higher 
degree of trust. 
 
Moderately 
Table 19: Summary of the hypotheses. 
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4.6 Discussion 
The results have clearly demonstrated that trust is an important part explaining successful 
supply chain management and that the issue has not been studied enough in supply chain 
context. Supply chain literature has been dominated by technology, process integration, and 
other technical aspects rather than understanding the people who collaborate in the chains. This 
is hopefully changing as the respondents at least in Finland view similarly that the role of 
technology is exaggerated in supply chain management. 
 The results of this paper suggest that the human elements of supply chains should be 
studied more carefully as a significant part of supply chain management is about human 
psychology. As the model of the study demonstrates, the supply chain management literature 
should take new steps making the discipline truly polyphonic and to focus on collaboration 
rather than just the technicalities. 
 
4.6.1 Limitations 
Although being quite extensive, the study has certain limitations. First of all, the poll of 
respondents, which was studied, consisted only of Finns as the questionnaire was in Finnish. 
The awareness of the issues covered could be significantly different in other geographical or 
cultural areas in the world, influenced by cultural factors, geopolitics, institutions, etc. 
Therefore, there should be some cautions before generalizing the results to a global context. 
 Other limitations include the use of Likert scales as the basis of statistical analysis. The 
debate is partially ongoing in the field whether Likert scales are “continuous enough” for 
conducting OLS analysis. However, plenty of scientific data show that this is allowed, but 
should be done by cautions (Grace-Martin 2008). An ordered logit analysis can be done to test 
and confirm whether it gives similar results than the OLS model (Grace-Martin 2008). In this 
case, the results were akin to the linear regression models which were used. Other literature 
reveal it is a myth that Likert scales cannot be used as a basis of parametrical analysis (Carifio 
& Perla 2007). Some academicians consider that the debate is still ongoing (Grace-Martin 
2008). 
 The third issue is that the setting of the questions and their order of appearance was not 
randomized, which is usually recommended in these types of questionnaires. This might have 
affected to the responses. This issue was discovered after conducting the questionnaire and 
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could not be altered afterward. This could have in theory a small effect on the reliability of the 
results. It could also be argued that some of the questions were perhaps leading the respondent. 
This could be the case, though the questionnaire was double checked and verified by the 
supervisor of this thesis, to avoid unconscious biases. 
 The fourth issue might be the personal biases and presumptions of the author. This 
could be the case in as the author has plenty of own views on society and interests to social and 
political theories of authors such as Hayek and Harisalo. The author could have affected the 
study by his or her prejudice. 
 The fifth issue is that the questionnaire format might be too narrow to capture the true 
nature of several phenomena which were covered. It could be that since the research questions 
were broad, it might be that some of the separate elements of those should have been studied 
more closely, in more focused studies. Furthermore, the questionnaire collected subjective 
evaluations of the respondents (agree or disagree) and was not studying any neutral numerical 
variables, which could have been answered without any subjective valuation. This subjectivity 
might limit the extent on how the results can be generalized and might create some form of 
bias to the data. 
 
4.7 Suggestions for future research 
As the range of the study is wide and looking at the phenomenon of trust with a holistic 
perspective, some aspect of the results should be explored more with a narrower and more 
detailed scope. Also, with separate studies. For example, the relationship and dynamics of tacit 
knowledge and trust should be explored more in detail. The deep core of trust in supply chains 
should also be studied with other respondent groups than only with Finnish respondents. 
The results where the knowledge-based view on trust is more meaningful perspective 
compared to calculus-based view needs more evidence because the viewpoints are conflicting. 
The results of this study need more additional evidence from future research to back its 
respondent data and results from 220 people. 
 The mechanics of building trust should also be studied further through qualitative 
research since the phenomenon is demonstrated in this study to be deeply human. Therefore, 
the nuances could be examined more descriptively by interviews and by looking more carefully 
at the human experiences of forming trust. Phenomenology could be applied to this 
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accordingly. This study has only established its view on literature and quantitative data. The 
small details and more tacit pieces of knowledge on trust-building might be better caught by 
interviews and other qualitative research. 
 The effect of time preference on trust in supply chains, which the author thinks there 
exists, though not supported by the results, should be studied further. A clear a priori reasoning 
tells it should exist, but no evidence was found. Perhaps this phenomenon is also more 
multidimensional and requires the psychological nuances to be taken more carefully into 
account. Instead of only a questionnaire, this aspect could be studied through different 
empirical cognitive test settings.  
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5 Conclusions 
This master’s thesis has done an extensive literature review on the valued scientific papers on 
trust, particularly in supply chain context. Based on these findings a theoretical framework has 
introduced and finally tested through empirical analysis in the form of a questionnaire to 
logistics experts all around Finland. 
The research questions of this thesis were: 
1. What is trust, and what is its relationship with Supply Chain Management? 
2. Can trust be seen as a capital? 
3. How is trust accumulated in Supply chain collaboration? 
4. Is the nature of trust in supply chain context more calculative or knowledge-based? 
5. How can trust building be encouraged to increase the performance of the supply chains? 
Based on the results of this thesis it can be concluded that trust is an important social factor 
(a social glue) in supply chains explaining the competitive advantages for collaborating 
companies in various ways. Trust is accumulated from reciprocity and common understanding 
of the parties. Trust is more easily lost than gained because the existence of reciprocity norm 
punishes those agents who are not willing to play by the common rules and acts 
opportunistically. Trust is the essential factor explaining successful supply chain management. 
It is needed to flourish new highly advanced and high-flying technical innovations as well as 
to guarantee the efficient flow of information, goods, and services. Trust helps to tackle the 
bullwhip effect because it decreases the behavioral uncertainty between the companies. 
 Trust is accumulated in a temporal context through reciprocity of the parties in a certain 
context, which is affected by cultural factors, institutions, law and contract enforcement and 
information asymmetry, and so forth. Forming trust is usually slow and iterative, and goes 
through different stages, based on the familiarity, affection, and history between the parties 
involved in trust associated acts. Trust can be viewed as a capital since it is clearly an asset for 
the companies working in the market environments. Companies carry their reputation and trust 
capital as a signal of their competence and goodwill. Information sharing, perceived efficiency, 
and seamlessness of the collaboration and the reputation of the partner companies in a supply 
chain companionship explains the existence of trust in the supply chain. 
 The knowledge-based theory of trust explains the phenomenon better in supply chain 
context than the calculus-based theory, meaning trust is not fundamentally about game 
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theoretical and calculative utility maximization but is deeply rooted in motives such as 
compassion, empathy, and goodwill. Trust is more holistic and multi-dimensional than the 
transaction economics explain. Assets specific investments and good contracting as 
explanatory factors of trust are exaggerated. 
 Trust building can be encouraged in supply chains in several manners, such as 
knowledge management and organizational policies, which promote the creation and 
exploitation of tacit knowledge. Affinity groups are a good way to ensure the flow of highly 
valuable tacit and inimitable sort of informal knowledge between and in the organizations. 
Extensive sharing of information with the partners create trust and allows to tackle the 
inefficient buffer inventories and remove slack (additional capacity) from the supply chain.  
As supply chain management is greatly about human psychology and confidence, 
signaling trust and sharing information seems to be the greatest assets to enhance partnerships 
in supply chains. This thesis suggests that though trust is a complex phenomenon, it should not 
be neglected by the organizations. Instead, it should be studied more and managed with a high 
priority in the organizations. Collective learning, understanding, and affection-based trust 
through interpersonal relationships allow companies to evolve their partnerships and to develop 
new highly technical innovations and sustainable competitive advantages. 
 
5.1 Theoretical contribution 
This thesis has demonstrated that trust in the context of supply chain management is explained 
better by the knowledge-based theory, rather than the calculus-based view on trust. This means 
that supply chain management should be seen in a holistic way from the perspective of 
cognitive individuals, not from the narrow perspective of transaction economics (TCE). 
Interdisciplinary viewpoints should be taken into account at least from the field of evolutionary 
biology, microeconomics, cognitive science, game theory, and sociology, as they bring 
together a more holistic and realistic perspective to trust and collaboration in supply chain 
context. 
 Trust can be seen as a capital which is accumulated in a temporal context as people in 
supply chain collaboration learns about each other’s values, sentiments, mindsets, preferences 
and way they interact and react to the world. This means that trust is an asset, and trust building 
is an iterative process, which develops by time. Trust is learned slowly but can be lost in a short 
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time if some parties are not acting reciprocally. Trust is the most important factor for explaining 
successful supply chain management. 
 Trust is related to the openness of information sharing and the creation of tacit 
knowledge. The creation and use of tacit knowledge are one of the most important ways for 
companies to build sustainable competitive advantages, especially in information-intensive 
industries. This high-flying, inimitable and unique type of knowledge cannot be reproduced 
easily and therefore it is highly valuable. An atmosphere of robust trust in organizations is 
required in order for the company employees to learn collectively and develop new ideas. The 
results of this study confirm indeed that “Trust is at the heart of a collaborative innovation 
capability” as Fawcett et al. (2012) argues. 
 
5.2 Managerial implications 
Knowledge management and processes, which ensure the creation of interpersonal trust and 
information flow in the organizations, should be established. In a supply chain consisting of 
several companies, the so-called affinity groups are a good method to ensure the circulation of 
information, knowledge, and ideas. In these groups, people in different organizations can share 
a free dialogue and build interpersonal relationships so that the parties will understand each 
other better from the basis of knowledge and identification-based trust, rather than the calculus-
based trust. 
 Managers in companies should understand the deep tacit nature of knowledge and 
establish a corporate environment where this knowledge can be enhanced in a dialogue and 
exploited by the company to make more profit. Managers should understand that the flow of 
information and other intangible elements of supply chain collaboration create the competitive 
advantage rather than the tangible aspects. This requires a high amount of trust. 
The results imply that the management of the companies should establish corporate and 
supply chain level programs to incentivize the creation of interpersonal relationships and to 
form a company culture, which favors interaction among different parties in the supply chain. 
Managers should take seriously trust building in strategic supply chain alliances in the future.
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